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1   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper investigates principles-based regulation and whether or not it should be adopted 
as an appropriate regulatory framework for consumer protection in Australian digital 
communications.  It argues that principles-based regulation is superior to rules-based 
regulation because it gives each business the flexibility to meet regulatory obligations in the 
most efficient way while also empowering the regulator to play a more effective role in 
ensuring consumer protection in a fast moving sector.  Such an approach helps consumers 
by making their welfare, rather than compliance with a set of rules, the focus of regulation 
and helps business by focusing regulation on outcomes rather than detailed regulatory 
procedures. 
After canvassing the arguments for and against principles-based regulation and prescriptive 
regulation, the paper endorses a principles-based approach and recommends ten principles 
of consumer protection.  These principles, if adopted and properly enforced, will help to 
ensure that the interests of consumers are at the heart of consumer protection regulation.   
It is important to note that while principles should be central to regulation, some prescriptive 
rules and minimum standards will still be required to buttress the principles. 
To apply the principles the regulator needs to engage all of the stakeholders in a regulatory 
conversation.  This will create a reliable interpretive context through the development of 
guidance and precedent, which gives stakeholders more confidence and certainty in a fast-
changing environment.  The conversation would include meetings and consultations, 
prescriptive notices, best practice guidelines, publishing formal and informal guidance and 
publication of determinations. 
To gain insight into how to effectively implement principles-based regulation, the paper 
examines the experience of the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) in a 
case study.  The FSA’s experience in principles-based regulation highlights the essential 
importance of a regulator’s will to enforce regulation and the need for a regulator with a 
dedicated arm devoted solely to consumer protection. 
The paper also examines complaint handling and resolution to shed light on where 
complaints come from and ways in which the current complaint system can be improved to 
deliver better outcomes for consumers.  In markets with complex products and services 
there is often a disconnect between what a consumer believes or is led to believe a product 
or service will do, and what it actually does.  Many complaints can be eliminated before they 
occur by ensuring that customers have the necessary information to make informed 
decisions in their interest.  
Businesses that adopt a product lifecycle approach to customer service will see their 
products from the perspective of a customer.  These businesses will understand where 
service failures may occur and know how to meet the needs of customers.  To help facilitate 
this approach, the regulator should engage stakeholders and issue guidance and best 
practice guidelines about how businesses can implement a lifecycle framework that they can 
use to examine and improve their service. 
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However, when a complaint arises, businesses should view this as an opportunity to reach 
out to their customers and to improve their service.  Businesses should have a customer-
focused complaint handling and resolution system and they should use complaints as 
business intelligence to determine how they can better serve their customers.  Complaints 
data should also be used by the regulator to determine whether businesses are complying 
with the regulatory principles. 
The paper then considers regulatory enforcement, as proper enforcement is integral to the 
success of a regulatory scheme. Based on this analysis, the paper recommends a 
strengthening of the regulator’s role and an increase in enforcement powers. 
The paper concludes with a detailed set of recommendations to ensure that the Principles 
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2   INTRODUCTION  
 
2.1 Background 
This paper explores the idea of principles-based regulation for communications in Australia.  It 
proposes a new framework for a well-functioning market that improves consumer welfare and is good 
for businesses that care for consumers.  
A review of the evidence base at hand readily indicates that the current system is failing consumers 
and those businesses who want to succeed through better services and lower pricing.  Accordingly, 
the paper seeks to put forth a viable, future proof, alternate vision of a regulatory framework for 
communications.  Of paramount importance is that the vision places consumer welfare at the centre of 
policy and regulation.  
Telecommunications, broadcasting and the Internet are in transition towards a converged !digital 
economy".   Where possible, communications regulation and regulation of other markets should apply 
common policies across the economy.  A starting point for reform is the elaboration of principles-
based regulation.  This paper, then, seeks to answer a series of questions: 
• What is principles-based regulation?  
• What are its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats? 
• How could it deliver better outcomes for consumers? 
• What would this mean for existing institutions and obligations? 
• What are the options for its adoption? 
 
2.2 Methodology 
To determine how principles-based regulation would fare as the basis for consumer 
protection regulation for digital communications in Australia, we first conducted an extensive 
review of relevant literature on principles-based regulation, complaint resolution and 
regulatory enforcement.  We then engaged in a series of interviews with a number of expert 
stakeholders across government, regulators, industry, academics and consumer groups to 
inform our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the current scheme, as well as 
the strengths and weaknesses of principles-based regulation.  Quotes from meetings with 
interviewees appear in breakout boxes through the report, with permission. 
Finally, drawing on these sources, we propose a schema of how principles-based-regulation 
might work for digital communications in Australia.  
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3   PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION 
 
3.1 What is principles-based regulation? 
First and foremost, principles-based regulation focuses on outcomes rather than prescriptive 
rules.1  Under principles-based regulation, regulators will put forward “desirable regulatory 
outcomes” and then enshrine those outcomes “in principles and outcome-focused rules.”2  
As with many ideas, principles-based regulation consists in a family of related concepts, not 
all of which will always be present in any particular instance of the idea.  Generally stated, 
however, principles-based regulation moves “away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive 
rules” towards “more … high-level, broadly stated rules or Principles to set the standards by 
which regulated firms must conduct business.”3 
To flesh out the distinction between rules and principles, consider the following: whereas an 
ordinary bright line rule might say that “[a] firm must execute all orders of under 10,000 
securities within one business day”, a corresponding principle might merely state that “[a] 
firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.”4  As this 
sample principle demonstrates, principles tend to (i) be “drafted at a high level of generality”, 
(ii) “contain terms which are qualitative and not quantitative”, (iii) be “purposive, expressing 
the reason behind the rule” and (iv) “behaviour standards, focusing on, for example, the 
‘integrity’ , ‘skill care and diligence’ and ‘reasonable care’ with which authorised firms or 
approved persons conduct and organise their businesses and the fairness with which they 
treat customers and manage conflicts of interest.”5 
                                                
1 Financial Services Authority, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON OUTCOMES THAT 
MATTER 4 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf; Peter 
Wallison, FAD OR REFORM: CAN PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION WORK IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 2, American Enterprise Institute (2007). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a success of Principles-based 
regulation, LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REVIEW 191, 191 (2007). 
4 Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation, LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND 
ECONOMY 15 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267722 (last visited Jul 22, 
2010).  See also, Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a success of 
Principles-based regulation, LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REVIEW 191, 192 (2007); John 
H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 381, 831 (2008). 
5 Id at 13. 
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“[Principles-based regulation] 
requires directors to act in a 
way that says, ‘What ought I 
do in this circumstance?’  
You want to do the right thing 
by customers.  You don’t 
look for wiggle room or a way 
out.” – Michael Malone, 
Managing Director, iiNet 
Principles-based regulation is also characterised by “intensified reliance on the senior 
management”.6   Rather than merely require the implementation of a detailed set of rules, 
principles-based regulation encourages senior management to “think hard about the 
[regulatory] principles … in terms not of mechanisms which have to be adopted but rather in 
terms of the outcomes which [the regulator is] seeking.”7  Under a principles-based 
regulatory approach, a regulator essentially goes to a 
business and says, “Look, no one knows your business 
better than you do.  We have a group of principles here 
that you need to adhere to but we are not going to give 
you prescriptive advice as to how to do that.  You know 
your business.  Here are the principles."8  The 
underlying idea is that this approach both gives 
businesses the flexibility to meet regulatory 
requirements in the manner most efficient to them and 
also requires them to be more active in developing 
mechanisms to meet regulatory obligations. 
 
3.2 The arguments for principles-based regulation 
The arguments for principles-based regulation are in large part the same as the arguments 
against rule-based regulation. 
In the wake of the failures of Enron and WorldCom, businesses that “were once celebrated 
as two of the world’s most successful companies” before being “exposed as corrupt 
organisations run by fraudsters”9, some criticised the rule-based Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) as being little more than “a road map for sham transactions 
that auditors and analysts could not easily penetrate.”10  In the Enron case, for example, “[i]t 
was difficult to find that Enron had actually violated any of the GAAP rules” even though it 
                                                
6 Callum McCarthy, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION - WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE INDUSTRY?, 
para 4, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1031_cm.shtml (last 
visited Jul 28, 2010). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ronald Gould, ‘Financial Regulation—Flattering Misconceptions’, conference presentation 
at the American Enterprise Institute, March 29, 2007, available at 
http://www.aei.org/event/1483/. 
9  BBC NEWS | Business | The banks that robbed the world. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3086749.stm [Accessed September 13, 2010]. 
10 Peter Wallison, ‘Fad or Reform: Can Principles-Based Regulation Work in the United 
States?’, AEI Outlook series at 3 (2007), available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/26325 
(last visited Jul 26, 2010). 
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had hid billions in debt from the company’s board and audit committee.11  To respond to 
companies exploiting loopholes the way Enron did, a regulator may create new “ex-post 
rules to address market misconduct,” but the problem with this approach is that it puts the 
regulator on a “path to an ever burgeoning handbook, full of detailed rules to prevent further 
misdemeanor.”12 
At the heart of this objection is the idea that rules are necessarily both over and under 
inclusive.13  Consider H. L. A. Hart’s well-known example of a legal rule that forbids one to 
take a vehicle into a public park.14  Such a rule would presumably prohibit automobiles, but it 
is not clear as to whether the rule would include bicycles, toy automobiles or airplanes.15  
Depending upon how the rule is construed, it may omit things that the regulator wished to 
capture (under-inclusiveness) or include things the regulator wished to omit (over-
inclusiveness). From this perspective, regardless of how carefully the statute is worded or 
how many times it is revised, the statute will necessarily be both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive “[i]n part because human beings are fallible, in part because they have imperfect 
knowledge of a changing future, and in part because he world is in itself variable… [E]ven 
rules that seem now to be neither under- nor over-inclusive with respect to their background 
justification retain the prospect of becoming so.”16  On this theory, the over and under 
inclusiveness of rules is an intrinsic and insurmountable problem with rule-based regulation; 
this shortcoming also features prominently in the justification for principles-based regulation, 
as will be seen. 
Rules, argues the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK’s 
consolidated financial regulator, also preclude a firm from achieving an objective in the 
business’s most efficient way insofar as they “dictat[e] … how firms should operate their 
businesses.”17  This is because detailed rules spell out the various necessary steps to 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 John Tiner, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR INSURERS para 9 
(2006), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0320_jt.shtml (last 
visited Jul 28, 2010). 
13 David Kershaw, Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation, 
68 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 594, 605 (2005). 
14 H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the separation of law and morals, 71 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
593, 607 (1958). 
15 Ibid. 
16 David Kershaw, Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation, 
68 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 594, 606 (2005) (quoting F. Schauer, Playing By The Rules: 
A Philosophical Examination of Rule Based Decision Making in Law and Life (Oxford: 
Claredon Press, 1991) at 35). 
17 Financial Services Authority, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON OUTCOMES 
THAT MATTER 4 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf.  See 
also Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a success of Principles-based 
regulation, LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REVIEW 191, 192 (2007) 
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comply with a regulatory goal, even though it is unlikely those particular steps will be 
maximally efficient for every firm and even though a particular firm may be able to achieve 
the same goal with a different and subjectively more efficient set of steps.  In short, the 
argument is that a one-size-fits-all approach is needlessly inefficient.  
Finally, rules are criticised for “only treating the symptoms of market failure and neglecting 
the root causes”18, being “inaccessible to many firms’ senior management” because they are 
so detailed and numerous19, and “divert[ing] attention towards adhering to the letter, rather 
than the purpose of … regulatory standards.”20  The contention that rules treat only the 
symptoms of market failures finds its root in the idea that rules respond only to existing 
problems by trying to eliminate particular manifestations of that problem, rather than 
eliminating the problem itself (which rules are ill-equipped to do as they are finite and the 
manifestations of problems may be infinite).  Rules are also thought to be inaccessible to 
senior management because rules are so detailed and complex that only experts in 
compliance can understand them.  This is problematic because a company’s experts in 
compliance are often not the senior managers tasked with making the decisions, so there is 
a disconnect between those who make the decisions and those who ensure compliance with 
policy.  Finally, the concern about focusing on the letter rather than the purpose of a 
regulatory standard is based in the idea that firms may see rule-based regulation as a series 
of checklists, rather than as attempts to achieve certain outcomes; this criticism too is central 
to the proponents of principles-based regulation. 
Principles-based regulation’s biggest attractions are that it gives regulators the flexibility to 
uphold the both the letter and spirit of the law, thereby closing loopholes and helping to 
future-proof regulations, while at the same time allowing businesses to achieve regulatory 
aims in ways that are maximally efficient for each particular business.  In addition, principles-
based regulation is responsive to perceived weaknesses in rule-based systems.  According 
to John Braithwaite: 
The thicket of rules we end up with becomes a set of sign-posts that 
show the legal entrepreneur precisely what they have to steer around 
to defeat the purposes of the law.  Broad proscriptions against a 
phenomenon like insider trading can engender more certainty than a 
                                                
18 John Tiner, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR INSURERS (2006), para 
9 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0320_jt.shtml (last 
visited Jul 28, 2010). 
19 Financial Services Authority, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON OUTCOMES 
THAT MATTER 6 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf.  See 
also Eric R. Dinallo, NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT ISSUES FIRST PRINCIPLES-BASED 
REGULATION PROPOSING PRINCIPLES FOR BOTH REGULATED AND REGULATORS, para 6 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2007/p0711051.htm (last visited Jul 27, 2010). 
20 Ibid. 
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patchwork of specific rules that define A, B, C, D, E and F all as 
forms of insider trading.21 
To Braithwaite, a high level rule or principle that generally, for example, prohibits insider 
trading reduces the possibility of creative compliance by prohibiting the act in general, rather 
than trying to spell out (and prohibit) every instance that constitutes the act.  In doing so, a 
principle is thought to help avoid the over and under inclusiveness of rules insofar as 
principles can easily be applied to include only relevant conduct.  Put another way, principles 
are thought to be flexible enough to catch behaviour that would otherwise comply with the 
letter of the law, but not the spirit of the law.22 
Supporters of principles-based regulation use the fact that the United Kingdom does not 
have an equivalent to Enron or WorldCom as evidence of principles-based regulations’ 
efficacy.  For example, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), an insurance industry 
lobbying group, argued, before the UK Parliament’s Select Committee on Treasury 
(Treasury Committee):  
It would be wrong to shift towards a more rule-based approach in the 
wake of Enron, not least because that would encourage companies 
and their auditors to seek loopholes.  It is commonly considered that, 
had Enron been incorporated in the UK, it would not have been able 
to move so much of its business off its balance sheet, or to book 
future profits prematurely, or to treat turnover in energy trading as 
revenue.23   
For the ABI, principles are the cure to loopholes, as principles remove the focus from 
complying with the letter of the law in lieu of the underlying principle.  The International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), “an independent, not-for-profit private sector 
organisation working in the public interest”,24 agrees, arguing that “detailed guidance 
(sometimes referred to as bright lines) encourages a rule-book mentality of ‘where does it 
                                                
21 John Bradford Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 47, 56 (2002). 
22 See, e.g. Andromachi Georgosouli, The nature of the FSA policy of rule use: a critical 
overview, 28 LEGAL STUDIES 119-123 (2008). 
23 SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY, SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY SIXTH REPORT, 
Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 3 paras 13-14 (2002), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/758/758ap04.htm 
(last visited Jul 28, 2010). 
24 About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB. Available at: 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm [Accessed September 13, 
2010]. 
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say I can’t do this?’”25  As a result, the IASB “favour[s] an approach that requires the 
company and its auditor to take a step back and consider whether the accounting suggested 
is consistent with the underlying principle.” 26  The IASB believes that this is “not a soft 
option” and that the “approach requires both companies and their auditors to exercise 
professional judgement in the public interest.”27  For the IASB, such an approach is found in 
“a clear statement of the underlying principles [that] will allow companies and auditors to 
deal with those situations [in which one might attempt to violate the spirit of the law] without 
resorting to detailed rules.”28 
The Treasury Committee ultimately agreed with the ABI and the IASB by concluding: 
We agree with the Government that a principles-based approach is 
preferable to a rules-based approach. Although the, sometimes 
difficult, judgements that must be made in a principles-based 
approach lack the apparent certainty of a rules-based approach, we 
take the view that the events of Enron demonstrate the hazards of 
the latter, legalistic, approach.29 
For these parties, principles are superior to bright line rules insofar as principles help to 
prevent loopholes by emphasising compliance with the underlying justification for a 
regulation rather than merely complying with the wording of a regulation. 
Although the prevailing view in the literature is that principles-based regulation prevents 
loopholes, not everyone agrees that principles prevented a United Kingdom version of Enron 
or WorldCom.  For example, William W. Bratton argues: 
Contrary to former Chairman [of the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission] Pitt’s assertions, a move to standards solves 
nothing.  Standards only work when the actor authorized to apply 
them takes responsibility for exercises of judgment… The drafters of 
Sarbanes-Oxley [an accounting reform and investor protection act] 
were right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to 
the crisis, but wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislative.  This is 
not for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits of rules 
and standards in the drafting of statutes.  It is instead a problem of 
                                                
25 Id at Appendix 12, para 14, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/758/758ap13.htm 
(last visited Jul 28, 2010). 
26 Id at para 15. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Id at Corporate Governance, para 22, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/758/75804.htm 
(last visited Jul 28, 2010). 
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professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both.  It is 
the auditors who need to get back to principles, taking seriously 
principles already governing the reporting system.30 
For Bratton, the regulatory system in which Enron and WorldCom occurred consisted of both 
rules and standards.  The problem, according to this account, was not that there were too 
many rules and too few principles, but that the existing principles were disregarded.  If firms 
simply disregard regulation, principles do nothing to stop compliance abuse. 
Bratton’s argument does not appear to be against principle-based regulation and in favour of 
rule-based regulation, however.  Instead, his argument highlights the importance of 
regulatory enforcement.  The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a 
government agency whose mission is to “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation”31, echoes this sentiment by acknowledging 
the argument that the “principles-based regime in the U.K. was not successful until coupled 
with an effective enforcement mechanism.”32  This literature suggests that a regulator cannot 
rely only on principles while overlooking enforcement. 
Principles, it is argued, are also superior to rules in adapting to change.33  Whereas rules 
may require updating to adapt to new circumstances (and such updating can involve new 
consolation, regulation and legislation), principles are put forward as being “future proof”.34  
When a new technology or service comes along, a principle (e.g. customer service) will still 
apply, argue the proponents of principles-based regulation, whereas a rule may or may not 
apply.  In this way, principles-based regulation is responsive to the problem of inflexibility of 
rules-based regulation. 
Some, such as the United States SEC argue that principles-based regulation increases 
transparency by creating an incentive for disclosure.  A study by SEC employees on 
principle-based regulation concluded that “under an objectives-oriented regime, there is a 
greater incentive for management to ‘tell its story’” to consumers.35  For example, a 
                                                
30 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1023, 1055 (2003). 
31 How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation (Securities and Exchange Commission). Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [Accessed September 13, 2010]. 
32 Securities and Exchange Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a 
Principles-Based Accounting System, s. III(J), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last visited Jul 27, 2010). 
33  Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a success of Principles-based 
regulation, LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REVIEW 191, 195 (2007). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Securities and Exchange Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a 
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“[Principles-based regulation] 
has the benefit that it makes 
[regulation] clear at a high level 
for consumers and industry 
about what norms and good 
practices should be… but it 
may be difficult to work out if… 
[it] is being enforced properly 
or followed.” – Professor 
Cosmo Graham, University of 
Leicester 
company’s compliance information concerning detailed prescriptive rules can itself be 
detailed and difficult to comprehend, thus creating a disincentive for a firm to actively put this 
information in the hands of consumers.  However, the SEC report argues that under an 
objectives-based regime (e.g. principles-based regulation) an individual is likely to 
understand a plainly stated regulatory objective as well as the relevant information as to 
whether the company is meeting the objective.36  Consequentially, as the principles-based 
compliance information will be meaningful to a consumer, a company will have a better 
incentive under a principles-based regime to disseminate this information to consumers.  
The SEC also argues that “under an objectives-oriented regime, users have a greater 
incentive to participate in the standard setting process.”37  Again, the reason comes down to 
the clarity and simplicity of principles compared to detailed rules.  Ordinary individuals are 
more likely to understand a debate about objectives-based principles than they are a debate 
about the various subclauses of detailed rules, according to the SEC.38  For the SEC, this 
means that principles-based regulation lowers the debate’s “barrier to entry” and enables the 
regulator to “reach out to key user stakeholders to engage them in the process” thereby 
increasing the “likelihood that standards would be issued which result in … information that 
is more meaningful to users.”39 
Finally, principles are said to be easy for everyone in the 
company to understand, from the most senior to the 
most junior.  Whereas complex rules may require close 
reading or detailed knowledge, employees and 
customers alike can easily understand general 
principles.  Further, employees will know that consumers 
can easily understand principles and that consumers will 
therefore be more likely to hold them to account.  This 
means that the principles can more effectively become 
part of the corporate culture as well as a business driver 
that will benefit the business actively, rather than 
devolving into a simple legalistic checklist exercise. 
                                                                                                                                         
Principles-Based Accounting System, s. III(I)(ii), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last visited Jul 27, 2010). 
36 Id at s. V(A). 
37 Id at s. III(I)(ii). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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3.3 The arguments against principles-based regulation  
A chief criticism coming from the United States is that principles-based regulation gives too 
much discretion to the regulator.  Peter Wallison uses an example of a nation’s tax system to 
make his point about the dangers of discretion.40  Compared to a rule-based system, which 
might require people who make more than X dollars per year to pay Y dollars in taxes, a 
principles-based tax system might say that everyone should pay a fair percentage of his or 
her income.  Wallison argues that this places the regulator in control of how to interpret, in 
this example, what is ‘fair’ and consequently gives the power associated with the rule to the 
regulator in an unprecedented way.41   
Wallison also argues that principles-based regulation can limit market entry.42  Because 
regulatory decisions “may not always be transparent or consistent with one another,” a firm 
“that receives a favorable ruling from a regulatory agency about how it can or should conduct 
its business can have a competitive edge over companies that are not aware of the decision 
or are otherwise differently treated.”43  Even if the relevant principle is published and well 
known within the industry, Wallison argues that a regulator may informally accept a 
company’s particular way of doing business, thereby leaving its competitors in the dark 
about the method that is informally accepted.44  Wallison contrasts this to rules which are 
“transparent and promote[ ] competition.”45  The main thrust of this argument is tied to the 
idea that principles give regulators too much discretion, only here the discretion is used anti-
competitively.  To illustrate this point, Wallison argues that under principles-based regulation 
a regulator, after intense lobbying from an interested party, might prohibit market entry or 
activity by a particular party under the guise of good policy when the action is really 
protectionism of favoured parties; rules, argues Wallison, are clear for all to see and do not 
permit this.46 
To Wallison, principles-based regulation is necessarily much less transparent than rule-
based regulation.  He argues that “detailed written rules assure that both the regulator and 
the regulated know what the rules are, despite a change in personnel on either side.”47  
                                                
40 Peter Wallison, ‘Fad or Reform: Can Principles-Based Regulation Work in the United 
States?’, AEI Outlook series at 2 (2007), available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/26325 
(last visited Jul 26, 2010). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Id at 4. 
43 Id at 3. 
44 Id at 3-4. 
45 Id at 4. 
46 Id. 
47 Id at 3. 
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“When you look for 
guidance you can look to 
precedent.” – Michael 
Malone, Managing 
Director, iiNet 
Under rule-based regimes there are clear procedures for change (such as consultation) that 
put all parties on notice of impending rule changes.  For Wallison, principles-based 
regulation is too informal and too much of it exists in the heads of the various players, and 
not in written policy.  However, this criticism seems to depend on the brand of principles-
based regulation (e.g. one that does not clearly articulate policy changes or interpretations) 
rather than being a criticism of principles-based regulation in general. 
In a similar vein, through its Regulatory Law Committee, the City of London Law Society, 
“one of the largest local Law Societies in the United Kingdom”,48  “has expressed 
apprehension about the unacceptable vagueness for firms as to how to satisfy a … regulator 
applying [a principles-based] approach.”49  Here, the contention is that complying with rules 
is straightforward but complying with principles is not.  Although it is true that a bright line 
rule (e.g. “Drive 60 km/h”) may be easier to follow, the risk is that rules encourage rigidity in 
company compliance (e.g. driving at 60 km/h in any and all conditions).  The International 
Accounting Standards Board seems to meet this criticism head on by arguing that the 
principles-based “approach requires … companies … to exercise professional judgement in 
the public interest.”50  
Whereas the Regulatory Law Committee of the City of London Law Society was concerned 
about firms’ interpretation of the principles, others worry “that once the detailed rules are 
gone, regulators may find it difficult to judge firms, leading to the possibility of 
inconsistencies and the development of unpublished regulatory standards.”51  The general 
thrust of these interpretive concerns is that rules are easy to interpret consistently and 
principles are not, and therefore rules are superior.  Again, 
this criticism is premised in a particular instantiation of 
principles-based regulation.  The criticism would not apply 
to a principles-based regulator that made interpretations 
consistently and clearly articulated and published its 
interpretations to all parties so that its decisions would have 
precedential value. 
                                                
48 Transputec plc., London. “The City of London Law Society ~Who We Are.” Available at: 
http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/Default.aspx?sID=752&lID=0 [Accessed September 13, 
2010]. 
49 John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 381, 385 (2008) (quoting a letter from Margaret 
Chamberlain, Chairman of the City of London Law Society Regulatory Committee, to 
John Tiner, Chief Executive of the Financial Services Administration) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
50 Ibid. 
51 John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 381, 385 (2008) (See Emily Perryman, FSA ‘Should Not 
Monitor Compliance Process,’ IFAONLINE, Aug. 10, 2006, 
http://www.ifaonline.co.uk/public/.) 
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The concept of enforcement under a principles-based regulatory system raises competing 
concerns.  For some, principles-based regulation relies too much on enforcement action 
because “the principles-based regulator monitors ‘what’ is being delivered, as opposed to 
‘how’ the firm is complying with specific rules,” and this means that “there is a likelihood that 
enforcement action will become one of the more significant tools in influencing industry 
behaviour.”52  On the other hand, there is concern that the alleged uncertainty inherent in 
principles-based regulation will “work against the regulator, making it difficult for a regulator 
to punish on the basis of principles that can be interpreted in so many different ways.”53 
The fear that principles-based regulation will necessarily lead to too much enforcement 
action did not eventuate in practice, however.  One of the reasons Peter Wallison believes 
that principles-based regulation will not work in the United States is because the Financial 
Services Authority, at the time a principles-based regulator, has not taken enforcement 
action often enough.54  Although it is true a principle can be interpreted in many ways, there 
are only a limited number of reasonable interpretations based in good-faith, and a regulator 
can account for this and regulate accordingly.  
The arguments against principles-based regulation are generally the same as the arguments 
for prescriptive rules-based regulation.   
For example, rule-based regulation limits regulatory discretion by transferring interpretive 
power over a rule’s meaning and scope from the regulatory agency to the regulated entity.55  
Further, this phenomenon becomes more pronounced as a rule becomes more and more 
detailed.56  In other words, as a rule spells out in ever greater detail what is or is not 
acceptable, the regulator in effect binds its own hands and prevents itself from sanctioning 
activity that falls outside the narrow confines of the rules.  For proponents of rules-based 
regulation, such limitation is good because it prohibits “unfettered government power.”57 
                                                
52 John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 381, 385 (2008) (quoting Philip Ryley, A Matter of Principle, 
LEGAL UPDATE (TLT Solicitors, Bristol, U.K.), 2006.. 
53 John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 381, 385 (2008) (quoting Adam Samuel, A Matter of 
Principle, LEGAL UPDATE (TLT Solicitors, Bristol, U.K.), Aug. 2006 
54 Peter Wallison, ‘Fad or Reform: Can Principles-Based Regulation Work in the United 
States?’, AEI Outlook series at 4-5 (2007), available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/26325 
(last visited Jul 26, 2010). 
55 See Walliston, supra n 10 at 2.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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It is also argued that rules are more transparent than principles when it comes to a change 
of personnel at a regulator.58  On this account, rules seem to be straightforward and clear, 
existing independently from a regulator’s interpretation.  However, this idea is based on the 
tacit assumption that rules are necessarily clearer than principles.  Similarly, some believe 
that rules are easier to apply in general, as they appear to be more straightforward.59  
Finally, there are those who argue that rules are superior to principles in promoting market 
entry.60  On this account, rules transparently tell each and every firm exactly which conduct 
is permissible and which conduct is not.61   
3.4 Case study: the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority 
Structured as “an independent, nongovernmental body,”62 the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) “is the UK’s integrated regulator for financial services, operating under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.”63  As the UK’s single financial regulator of financial 
services, the FSA is tasked with four main objectives: (i) “to maintain confidence in the UK 
financial system;” (ii) “to promote public understanding of the financial system;” (iii) to secure 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers while recognising their own responsibilities; 
and” (iv) to reduce the scope for financial crime.”64 
3.4.1 The inception of principles-based regulation at the FSA 
To achieve its statutory objectives the FSA obviously must create various rules and 
regulations, and it is pursuant to this task that the FSA first dabbled in principles-based 
regulation.  However, rather than regulating directly with principles, it bound itself to certain 
“principles of good regulation.”65  These principles require the FSA to do things such as use 
“its resources in the most economic and efficient way”, “facilitat[e] innovation” and be 
“proportionate in imposing burdens or restrictions on the industry.”66 
                                                
58 Id at 3. 
59 See John H. Walsh, supra n 49. 
60 See, Walliston, infra n 10.  
61 Id. 
62 William Michael Treanor et al., The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law: "The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?", 12 
FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 259, 265 (2006).   
63 Financial Services Authority, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON OUTCOMES 
THAT MATTER 1, 3 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
64 Financial Services Authority, INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 1, 4 
(2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsa_intro.pdf (last visited Aug 17, 2010). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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In addition, the FSA created eleven principles for firms to serve as an overall explanation of 
what the FSA was trying to achieve in its regulation.67  The principles are as follows:68 
1. A firm must conduct its business with integrity. 
2. A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. 
3. A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. 
4. A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. 
5. A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct. 
6. A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly. 
7. A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and 
communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not 
misleading. 
8. A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its 
customers and between a customer and another client. 
9. A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and 
discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its 
judgment. 
10. A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients’ assets when it is 
responsible for them. 
11. A firm must deal with its regulators in an open co-operative way, and must 
disclose to the FSA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the 
FSA would reasonably expect notice. 
As time went on, these principles became more central to the FSA’s regulatory approach, 
and by 2007 the FSA stated that the eleven principles “provide the very backbone of [its] 
regulatory regime.”69 
From consumer protection perspective, a number of principles stand out.  Principle 2 
requires businesses to conduct their activities with due care, skill, and diligence, Principle 6 
requires that a business pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them 
fairly, Principle 7 requires that a firm pay attention to a client’s information needs and not 
mislead the customer and Principle 9 requires that businesses give consumers suitable 
advice. 
To buttress these consumer protection principles, the FSA developed the Treating 
Customers Fairly initiative in an attempt to “see a step-change in the behaviour of the 
                                                
67 Financial Services Authority, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON OUTCOMES 
THAT MATTER 1, 9 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Id at 8. 
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financial services sector and therefore to deliver improved outcomes for retail consumers.” 70 
In particular, the FSA seems to have been addressing a perceived failure of firms to comply 
with Principle 6 and the requirement that a firm pay due regard to the interests of its 
customers and treat them fairly. 
However, “[b]ecause of the wide range of activities” in which businesses engage, the FSA 
recognised that it was “not possible to define TCF in a way that applies in all 
circumstances.”71  Further, more detailed rules would restrict the means by which 
businesses could achieve the desired results “without necessarily improving consumer 
protection.”72  To remedy this situation, the FSA recognised that businesses would “need to 
make their own assessment of what is appropriate for them, taking account of the nature of 
their business.”73  To make this assessment, the FSA expected all firms to embed TCF “into 
all aspects of their operations, including in all the different interactions they have with 
consumers.”74 
To help firms implement their own TCF strategy, the FSA suggested that business adopt a 
“product life-cycle as a simple framework that firms could use to structure their thinking 
about different aspects of TCF.”75  To this end, the FSA suggested that businesses address 
fair treatment in terms of: 
• product design and governance; 
• identifying target markets; 
• marketing and promoting the product; 
• sales and advice process; 
• after-sales information; and 
• complaint handling.76 
For the FSA, such a process would help businesses determine what constitutes 
‘fairness’ in a particular circumstance.77  The FSA also asked businesses to engage 
with it in a conversation about “what most effectively constitutes fair treatment of 
                                                
70 Financial Services Authority, Treating customers fairly - towards fair outcomes for 
consumers 1, 3 (2006). 





76 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY - PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS 
1, 4-5 (2004). 
77 Id at 5. 
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customers and how such approaches can be cascaded through organisations, large 
and small, to have the necessary impact on those customers.”78 
Out of this conversation the FSA crafted six outcomes that businesses must meet; they are 
as follows:79 
Outcome 1:  Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms 
where the fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate culture. 
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are 
designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted 
accordingly. 
Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept 
appropriately informed before, during and after the point of sale. 
Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and 
takes account of their circumstances. 
Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have 
led them to expect, and the associated service is both of an acceptable 
standard and as they have been led to expect. 
Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed 
by firms to change product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a 
complaint. 
In articulating these principle-based outcomes the FSA stated that these requirements are 
not new, as they are already embodied in the eleven principles for business.80  In this way, 
the TCF initiative can be seen as part of a further elaboration and elucidation of pre-existing 
obligations.  In particular, the FSA draws attention to Principle 6 and the requirement that “a 
firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.”81 
The FSA then went on to say that, as part of the TCF initiative, it does “not envisage 
introducing new rules as part of the TCF initiative.”82  Instead, the goal was to “tip[ ] the 
balance of [the FSA’s] regulation more towards principles and away from prescription.”83  
The FSA’s justification for this shift was that “a more principles-based approach [would] help 
to align good business practice in firms and markets with [the FSA’s] own statutory 
                                                
78 Id at 6. 
79 Financial Services Authority, Treating customers fairly - towards fair outcomes for 
consumers 1, 3 (2006). 
80 Id at 4.  In particular, the FSA points to Principles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Id at 5. 
83 Ibid. 
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objectives.”84  Under this new alignment, the FSA believed that firms and their senior 
management would be more likely to focus on meeting the principles and outcomes instead 
of merely complying with the letter of the regulation.85 
To help assuage fears that principles lack the “clarity and certainty associated with a rules-
based approach,” the FSA used a “range of approaches” to communicate to business what it 
expected of them.86  These approaches included “publication of case studies and of 
statements of good and poor practice” so that businesses might better understand the way in 
which the FSA interprets the principles and in what sort of behaviour the FSA expects a 
business to engage or not to engage.87 
At the heart of the shift to principles-based regulation seems to be the idea that “judgement 
and real understanding of the business” is more important than a “’tick-box’ mentality 
towards rule compliance.”88  Although the FSA agrees that “[b]oth regulators and the 
regulated find a sense of safety and security in detailed rules” because those rules “define 
the scope of [one’s] legal exposure.”89  However, the FSA advanced the argument that both 
parties need to “be bold enough to accept some uncertainty and ambiguity and to manage 
any consequent legal risks for the benefit of society and the markets as a whole.”90 
3.4.2 The problems with the FSA’s implementation of principles-based regulation 
The Financial Services Authority is being scrapped.91  Most of its power will be transferred to 
the Bank of England, with subsidiaries of the bank handling different aspects of the FSA’s 
current portfolio.92  In addition, an independent consumer protection agency will also be 
created.93 
As Ronald Gould, an FSA adviser stated at an American Enterprise Institute conference on 
principles-based regulation, “[W]e are much more oriented towards outcomes… If in fact 
you’re oriented primarily to achieving a desired outcome, you’re actually much less 





88 William Michael Treanor et al., The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law: "The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?", 12 
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89 Ibid. 
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91 Gonzalo Vina, U.K. SCRAPS FSA, REVERSING SYSTEM SET UP BY BROWN (UPDATE2) - 
BUSINESSWEEK, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/u-k-scraps-fsa-
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concerned with whether you’ve gotten a big fine out of someone or gotten a big newspaper 
headline.  Instead you much prefer to ensure that your statutory obligations toward the 
industry and consumers are being effective in the way they’re implemented.”94  Enforcement, 
then, was not a central focus to the FSA’s strategy. 
As further evidence of the FSA’s lack of emphasis on enforcement, consider statements by 
Margaret Cole, the FSA’s Director of Enforcement, at the Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. 
Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law: “[T]he FSA is not an enforcement-led 
regulator at all, but one that uses supervision and ongoing relationships with the firms as its 
front-line means of regulation.”95  This de-emphasis of enforcement was part of “London’s 
philosophy of ‘light-touch’” and it was central to the FSA’s approach towards regulation.96 
This approach proved popular in a booming financial market.  By September of 2006, 
“companies had raised more capital on the main market of the London Stock Exchange … 
than the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ combined.”97  That London had out-
performed New York “caused a great deal of concern in [United States] corridors of power”, 
leading to calls for reform of U.S. financial regulation to make it less burdensome and more 
able to compete against London.”98 
Those heady days did not last.  After the nationalisation of Northern Rock and Lloyds TSB’s 
takeover of HBOS, George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that 
England’s system of financial regulation had “failed spectacularly.”99  To remedy the 
situation, Osborne intends to “end the era of light-touch regulation and apply ‘strictly’ the 
laws governing the City.”100 The problem, however, does not appear to have been principles-
based regulation, but rather, lack of enforcement. 
Janet Walford, OBE, has argued in the Financial Times that the FSA’s “light touch principles 
based regulation was meant to encourage competition and innovation, but it led to 
recklessness and cupidity – not so much because it was principles based per se, but 
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because those principles were not upheld by those tasked to do so.”101  On this view the 
problem is not the regulatory structure, but the will of the regulators.  Agreeing with this view, 
Vince Cable, the then Liberal Democrat Treasury spokesman, has argued that “[t]he problem 
[with the UK’s financial regulation] is not structures – it has been a lack of will.”102  Expanding 
on this point, Janet Walford argues that “[t]he FSA already has extensive powers to police 
[the UK’s financial] industry, but if the tougher new FSA is really to be feared in the future, it 
needs to use its teeth.”103 
The FSA has been reticent to use its teeth, however.  Consider the phenomenon of insider 
trading, which is prohibited in the United Kingdom.  From 2001 to June 2007 the FSA issued 
only eight penalties for insider trading.104  Although it may appear that there is simply a low 
incidence of insider trading in U.K. financial markets, “insider trading … may have taken 
place before almost 25 percent of announced deals in 2005.”105  This number seems to have 
increased slightly as of 2008.106 
As late as 2009, Hector Sants, the CEO of the FSA and the man who will head up the FSA’s 
replacement subsidiary within the Bank of England, argued, “There is a view that people are 
not frightened of the FSA. I can assure you that this is a view I am determined to correct. 
People should be very frightened of the FSA.”107  This threat appears to have had some 
substance behind it.  Whereas only eight people were penalised for inside trading from 2001 
to mid-2007, from 2008 to March 2010 five individuals were convicted of insider trading and 
at least seven more individuals are set to face charges.108  It was not new rules or principles 
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that led to these actions, but the will to enforce the law.   This is a critical issue and it 
transcends the principles versus rules debate. 
Part of the problem seems to be that the FSA never quite decided what to do with its 
principles.  Even as Sants told his audience that people should fear the FSA’s enforcement 
authority, he articulated a vision for principles-based regulation that seemed to lack 
regulatory bite.  According to Sants 
“What principles-based regulation does mean and should mean, is moving away 
from prescriptive rules to a higher level articulation of what the FSA expects firms 
to do. In other words, it helps emphasise that what really matters is not that any 
particular box has been ticked but rather that when making decisions, executives 
know they will be judged on the consequences - the results of those actions… 
Similarly, the FSA, when it supervises, needs to supervise to a philosophy that 
says 'It will judge firms on the outcomes and consequences of their actions not on 
the compliance with any given individual rule'. Given this philosophy, a better 
strapline is 'outcomes-focused regulation'.”109 
Rather than attempt to recast principles-based regulation as outcomes-based regulation, the 
FSA simply needs to take adequate enforcement action for breaches of its principles-based 
regulation.  As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has noted, “[T] the existence 
of a strong and consistently applied enforcement mechanism is a necessary component to 
the success of an objectives-oriented system.”110  However, for the FSA’s enforcement 
director, “enforcement is a small part of the regulatory relationship” that is “used strategically 
for the most egregious cases and where necessary to protect markets and consumers.”111  
Instead, in cases of breach the FSA is more likely to rely on a supervised remediation 
program that “very often … won’t become public.”112  It is not that the FSA’s principles 
themselves are bad, or that the FSA lacked power to enforce, but rather that enforcement 
was not central to its goals. 
3.4.3 The problems with the Treating Customers Fairly initiative 
The TCF initiative suffered a dual failure.  First, it relied on the FSA to enforce the principles 
that made up the initiative and, as we have seen, enforcing principles has not been a focal 
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point for the FSA.  Second, consumer protection was not the main objective of the FSA.  
Although consumer protection was one of the four statutory objectives of the FSA113, market 
efficiency seemed to have priority over consumer protection.  For example, in stating that the 
FSA’s “single aim” is “to promote the statutory objectives”, the FSA’s enforcement director 
said that the organisation’s “clear preference is to encourage efficient markets.”114 
In numerous documents, the FSA mentions how companies should “make TCF an integral 
part of their business culture”115 so that companies “embed the principle of treating 
customers fairly in their corporate strategy and build it into their firm’s culture and day to day 
operations.”116  The implication of this approach is that if businesses embed treating 
customers fairly within their culture, then those businesses will produce fairer outcomes for 
customers.  This approach necessarily relies on the assumption that the companies will 
actually take seriously the structures created and information obtained in the TCF process 
that can be used as business intelligence.  Without that cultural acceptance of TCF, fairer 
outcomes are unlikely to obtain. 
As previously stated, the TCF initiative did not create new rules with which businesses had 
to comply.  Instead, it as “[asks] senior management to … put in place a review 
(proportionate to business size and complexity) of the degree to which they currently meet 
the existing FSA Principles and high level rules, and to remedy the position where they find 
they are adrift.”117  This approach appears to rely on the assumption that, once the TCF-
mandated structures are in place, businesses will use them to improve customer service.  
The results show otherwise.  According to a 2010 report on consumer perceptions of 
fairness within financial services, “principles of fairness are still compelling for consumers but 
the presiding feeling is that principles have not been upheld over the last 5 years and, if 
anything, fairness has declined in the financial services sector.”118 
Although the report does not diagnose the cause of TCF’s failure to create better outcomes 
for consumers, the cause may simply be that, as well designed as the TCF initiative was, 
companies never fully believed that it made sense for them to embed the TCF mentality into 
the core of their businesses.  Consequently, businesses simply focused on making money in 
the ways to which they were accustomed.  Similarly, the FSA have never fully internalised 
                                                
113 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, part I, s. 5. 
114 Treanor, William Michael et al. 2006. “The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law: ‘The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?’.” 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 12: 259, 269. 
115 Financial Services Authority. 2006. 1, 2 Treating customers fairly - towards fair outcomes 
for consumers. FSA. 
116 Financial Services Authority. 2004. 1, 4 Treating customers fairly - progress and next 
steps. 
117 Implementing principles based regulation. Available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1207_dw.shtml 
[Accessed August 30, 2010]. 
118 Opinion Leader. 2010. 1, 48 Consumer perceptions of fairness within financial services. 
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the need to actively protect consumers, and consequently their consumer protection mission 
remained subordinate to their market efficiency mission.  On this view, the success or failure 
of an initiative, ceteris paribus, may turn on an organisations collective belief.  That is to say, 
if ingrained into a regulator’s culture is the idea of  strictly enforcing regulation under its 
purview, then it will strictly enforce regulation under its purview, and if a business believes 
that it makes business sense to focus on the consumer experience, then it will do so. 
Regulation can fail of course without the appropriate framework—legal tools, infrastructure, 
etc.—but if the appropriate framework is in place, then the question is one of will or belief.  
As evidence of this, consider the FSA’s representation of itself today versus, say, circa 2007.  
In April of that year, the FSA wrote that although “[e]nforcement is part of any regulator’s 
toolkit”, in the FSA’s “case it is a comparatively small but nonetheless important part of [the 
FSA’s] overall regulatory strategy and approach.”119  Further, the FSA argued that their 
“approach is proportionate, reasoned and legally justifiable.”120  Back then, the FSA’s 
message on enforcement was almost reassuring.  Today, the FSA’s CEO has warned that 
“[p]eople should be very frightened of the FSA.”121  The FSA has the same mandate as it did 
in 2007 and is governed by the rules that in was in 2007.  However, the mood within the FSA 
has changed, and with this different mood comes a different vision of itself and its role. 
When initially shifting its focus to principles-based regulation, the FSA needed to reassure 
industry that the FSA was not about to embark on a highly subjective and impossible to 
anticipate method of enforcement. 122   To this end, the FSA downplayed its reliance on 
enforcement by emphasising its focus on compliance and working with industry to achieve 
the desired outcomes.123  Although the FSA indicated that it had, and would continue, to take 
action “on the bases of the Principles alone”, it also was careful to emphasize it would not 
“apply hindsight” in enforcement actions and that “it must be possible for a firm to predict at 
the time of action whether it would be a breach of a Principle.”124  Obviously applying 
hindsight against a reasonable (at the time) construction of a principle or a piece of guidance 
is unacceptable, and obviously businesses must be able to make calculated judgments of 
whether their actions will breach any regulation, but this does not mean that the regulator 
must downplay, not only in words, but in action, its enforcement role.   
                                                
119 Financial Services Authority. 2007. “Principles-based regulation: Focusing on outcomes 
that matter” 1, 14. Available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Delivering intensive supervision and credible deterrence. Available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml 
[Accessed August 30, 2010]. 
122 See supra arguments against principles-based regulation. 
123 See, e.g. Financial Services Authority. 2007. “Principles-based regulation: Focusing on 
outcomes that matter” 1, 14. Available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
(the FSA’s explanation of enforcement under a principles-based regulatory scheme). 
124 Ibid. 
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With the recent changes in the economic tides has come a new emphasis on enforcement.  
Although the FSA is still wary of harming economic efficiency with overly “aggressive 
intervention [that] will stifle innovation and arguably reduce risk to a level that inhibits 
economic prosperity”, the FSA is still willing to articulate a new “credible deterrence 
philosophy” approach to enforcement.125  In trumpeting this “more proactive approach to 
enforcement,” the FSA’s CEO, Hector Sants, argued, “[W]e have demonstrated by our 
actions that we will use all our powers including criminal prosecutions to deliver our mandate 
and we are not ducking that responsibility.”126  Sants then went on to inform his audience 
that the “the first of [the FSA’s] insider dealing criminal prosecutions has come to trial and 
[that the FSA has] several more in the pipeline.”127 
The lesson to draw from the FSA’s experience with the TCF and principles-based regulation 
in general does not appear to be a new one.  Rather, the lesson is essentially that one can 
lead a horse to water, but one cannot make it drink.  Put another way, a regulator can 
ensure that a regulated entity has a framework for customer service and understanding of 
compliance with principles, but even the best framework and set of principles in the world 
are useless if they lie unused.  The regulator needs to, in a sense, make the horse thirsty—
the regulator needs to give businesses a reason, that makes economic sense, to want to 
comply.  The underlying principle of the ‘credible deterrence philosophy’ seems be a step in 
this direction insofar as it appears to be premised on the idea that it must not make business 
sense for a company to choose not to comply with regulation.  By ensuring that a vision of 
enforcement is integral to the regulator the regulator will have the necessary preconditions 
for effective enforcement.  After that, it just needs the proper tools, as will be discussed later. 
 
3.5 Recommendation: Principles-based regulation should be adopted 
Principles-based regulation can deliver better outcomes for consumers.  Although not an 
optimal measurement of consumer satisfaction with the industry when looked at in 
isolation128, customer complaints are high in the telecommunications industry.129  Further, a 
                                                
125 Delivering intensive supervision and credible deterrence. Available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml 
[Accessed August 30, 2010]. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Complaints data, when viewed in isolation, does not necessarily indicate that a company 
is or is not failing its customers.  For example, a company with a relatively high number of 
complaints may actively encourage complaints so it can collect business intelligence and 
improve its product.  On the flip side, a company with a relatively low number of 
complaints may simply make it hard for consumers to complain at all.  Further, complaints 
to the TIO depend on consumers knowing about the TIO and having the patience to 
follow through on the complaint.  Complaints data is valuable, of course, but most of the 
value is found in the content of the complaint rather than the overall volume. 
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recent survey by the Bank of Queensland indicates that the majority of people surveyed find 
the telecommunications industry to have the worst customer service, when compared to 
retail, hospitality, banking and insurance.130  The dissatisfaction ranges from billing and 
payment disputes to quality of service and failure to provide bills upon request.131  Properly 
implemented, principles-based regulation can help ameliorate the situation giving all parties 
the flexibility and information they need to do their jobs.  Under principles-based regulation 
businesses will have the flexibility to implement regulatory requirements in their own 
maximally efficient ways, regulators will have the flexibility to respond to behaviour that 
violates the spirit of a regulation, consumers can easily know their rights, and from the 
regulatory conversation the industry in general should have a better understanding of both 
what is expected and how these expectations may be realised. 
By shifting the focus of the regulation on to outcomes principles-based regulation is able to 
deliver better outcomes for consumers.  Principles-based regulation emphasises the need 
for companies to examine their products and services from a life-cycle perspective in order 
to achieve the outcomes required by the regulation.  Therefore, this approach puts the 
customer and his or her interests at the heart of the regulation while also providing 
efficiencies to businesses insofar as they can create the outcomes in their own ways.  By 
helping to close loopholes that adhere with the letter, but not the spirit, of the law, principles-
based regulation can also help to make service providers more accountable insofar as they 
must comply with outcomes rather than prescriptive rules. 
Further, principles-based regulation is not unknown to Australia.  In contrasting rules versus 
principles, John Braithwaite explains how in Australia adherence to principles gives nursing 
home carers the flexibility to give preference to the interests of those for whom they care, 
whereas in the United States, the “rule-following mentality is a disaster for quality of care.”132  
In the United States, “staff who are more than just rote learners will show the personal 
integrity to rebel against [the rule following mentality]; they will get around the regulatory 
strictures of the checklist to respond particularistically to the manifest needs of the residents 
in their care.”133  However, this means both that mere rote learners will simply look at 
checklists.  If something is not on the list, it will be overlooked, even if salient, and if it 
something is contrary to the list, it will be reconciled to the demands of the list, even if the 
result is contrary to the interests of those in their care.134 
                                                                                                                                         
129 Asher, Allan, and Elissa Freeman. 2010. “Telecommunications: A Market Failing 
Consumers.” The Australian Economic Review 43(2): 194. 
130 Id at 198. 
131 Id at 194. 
132 Braithwaite, John Bradford. 2002. “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty.” 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27: 47, 67. Available at: [Accessed July 27, 2010]. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
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“We operate by principles with our 
children.  We don’t give them a list of 
rules—we try to explain why our 
principles apply in the circumstance.” 
– Michael Malone, Managing 
Director, iiNet 
Braithwaite argues that this slavish adherence to lists is absent in Australia because carers 
focus on “the best outcome for the residents” because they know that inspectors are 
“instructed only to be concerned about outcomes” rather than formal procedures and 
requirements.135  As a result, carers know that they can explain the situation and that a 
reasonable interpretation of the situation will lead to a reasonable outcome with an inspector.  
This contrasts sharply with the United States where the reasonable outcome (that is contrary 
to a rule) will require both the carer and the inspector to overlook the rules in an attempt to 
achieve the end anticipated by the very rules 
that they are breaking. 
Taken as a whole, the previously mentioned 
arguments for principles-based regulation—the 
efficiency gains for companies that are free to 
implement the requirements of regulation in a 
way that is best for them, the future-proofing, the 
loophole elimination and the elimination of creative compliance—indicate that principles-
based regulation is actually more certain than rule-based regulation, and this certainty is 
found by focusing on outcomes. 
To illustrate the point that principles-based regulation is more certain than rule based 
regulation because it focuses on outcomes, consider Braithwaite’s example of food in a 
nursing home: a company might provide identical food to two nursing homes, and whereas 
the first nursing home may rate the food as ‘satisfactory’, the second nursing home may rate 
the food as ‘needs improvement.’136  That people have different tastes and preferences 
obviates the possibility that a rule can ensure satisfactory food across a multitude of 
situations.  As Braithwaite puts it, “[t]wo teams might never agree on what is nice food, but 
we have found that they can agree, with high reliability, on whether the residents in a nursing 
home generally like the good they are getting.”137  This result is the rather counter-intuitive 
notion that “[r]eliability is accomplished by rejecting objectivity in favour of subjectivity.”138 
Similarly, if we make the principle of fairness the locus of the regulatory conversation, 
consumer protection regulation can consistently deliver satisfactory outcomes for 
consumers, across variables of time, gender, ethnic background, place, etc.  Fairness need 
not more specifically defined than its every day meaning, as then it would lose its flexibility 
and its subjectivity.  Instead, rather than try to pin ‘fairness’ down and interpret it as if it were 
a monolith, businesses and regulators should rely on the complaints data as an indication of 
whether or not consumers think that they are being treated fairly.  In this way, although there 
cannot be a single definition of fairness, there can be both the perception of fairness and 
genuine fairness within the telecommunications market.  To achieve this there must be (1) a 
                                                
135 Ibid. 
136 Id at 73. 
137 Ibid. 
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“You have principles, but on the 
back of that you develop certain 
rules and guidance on how to 
implement […] certain principles.” 
– Professor Cosmo Graham, 
University of Leicester 
consumer-friendly complaints processes139, (2) businesses that are responsive to those 
complaints, (3) a regulator with sufficient enforcement power to bring about regulatory 
compliance and (4) that regulator must be willing to use the full range of its regulatory toolkit.  
Taken in conjunction, this will allow consumers to express their will and for businesses and 
regulators to see if consumers, by their own standards, feel that they are being treated fairly.  
Further, it will give actionable evidence (i.e. the complaints data) that can be used to effect a 
change in the market place. 
3.5.1 Rules are still needed 
It s important to note that while principles should 
be central to regulation, there is still a need for 
rules to buttress the Principles.  Regulatory 
schemes are not a doctrinaire, an all or nothing 
game.    
 
3.5.2 Proposed Principles 
In short, only a single principle is needed: a business must treat its customers fairly.  For 
practical purposes, however, it is beneficial to elaborate on this principle to provide both 
specific and general guidance to businesses.  This is not to say that such guidance or further 
explication limits the first principle.  Rather, borrowing from Alfred North Whitehead, we 
might say that the safest general characterisation of consumer protection regulation is that it 
consists of a series of footnotes to Principle 1, which states that a business must treat its 
customers fairly. 
The strength of this principle is that everyone will always agree with the desired outcome, as 
nobody will reasonably argue that a business ought not to treat its customers fairly.  
Returning to the example of supplying food for a nursing home, whereas not everyone will 
agree on which food is satisfactory, everyone can agree whether or not the diners are 
satisfied.  Similarly, although not everyone will agree on which finite set of rules, taken as a 
totality, provide a fair environment for consumers, everyone can agree that consumers ought 
to be treated fairly, as nobody will reasonably argue that consumers ought to be treated 
unfairly.  In general, complaints data is the key to this, as it is complaints data that provides 
the feedback as to whether or not consumers are being treated fairly, and it is this data upon 
which the regulator can rely when determining whether or not a business must do more in 
terms of consumer protection.  Consequently, the complaints process must be as accessible 
as possible in order to elicit feedback from consumers.140 
 
 
                                                
139 See Suné Donoghue, infra n 156.  
140 Id. 
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Principle 1: Businesses must treat their customers fairly. 
 
            Principle 2: Businesses must respect the privacy of their customers. 
Principle 3: Businesses must provide their customers with clear, accurate 
and relevant information on products and services before, during and, 
where appropriate, after the point of sale. 
 
Principle 4:  Businesses must resolve customer disputes quickly and fairly. 
 
Principle 5:  Businesses must ensure that advertising and promotion of 
products and services is clear, accurate and not misleading. 
 
Principle 6:  Businesses must have appropriate policies and practices in 
place to assist customers who are disadvantaged or vulnerable. 
 
Principle 7:  A business that breaches the principles-based regulation will 
provide an effective remedy for the customer and may be liable to an 
effective sanction. 
 
Principle 8:  Businesses will develop ongoing monitoring and reporting 
measures designed to ensure successful implementation of the 
principles-based regulation. 
 
Principle 9:  Customers will behave honestly in their dealings with 
businesses and cooperate with businesses when seeking to resolve 
any problems or disputes. 
 
Principle 10:  For transparency and accountability, businesses will have 
their compliance with the principles-based regulation reviewed and 
reported by an external auditor.  
 
Note: whether a principle has been breached or not depends upon all the circumstances, 
including the principle in question, the conduct at issue and the parties concerned. 
Together, these principles are meant to provide a foundation that both protects consumers’ 
interests while at the same time allowing companies the flexibility to meet the outcomes 
envisioned by the principles in the ways that are best for each company.  However, it is not 
enough to merely state the principles.  Instead, meaning must be given to the principles, and 
that happens as part of the regulatory conversation, which is discussed in detail in the 
coming section.141 
Principle 1 is the bedrock principle upon which the others are based.  Although it may 
appear that terms such as ‘openly’ and ‘fairly’ are too ethereal to have any purchase without 
definition and explication, further definition would only serve to limit the Principle’s 
application.  Instead, to give meaning to this and other principles complaints data, as 
                                                
141 Supra s 1.7.3.  
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“[The number of complaints is partially 
due to] an increase in complexity in the 
services and equipment offered by 
telecommunications companies.” 
– Simon Cohen, Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman 
previously stated, can provide the objective evidence for whether or not consumers feel they 
are being treated fairly, and this gives concrete evidence of whether or not a supplier is in 
breach of the principles.  Transactional and procedural fairness is also a feature of the 
ordinary definition of fairness and businesses must  
Principle 2 is meant to ensure that businesses focus on a customer’s privacy interests.  Such 
focus would necessarily include being consistent with the National Privacy Principles, though 
this may not be sufficient depending upon the particular circumstance. 
Principle 3 is meant to ensure that customers are adequately informed before they make 
their purchases.  The literature shows that as products and services become more complex, 
consumers are more likely to have come to the table with a complete understanding of the 
way in which a product or service will function.  From the outset there will be information that 
consumers will want to know, even if they do not know to ask the question.  For example, 
when purchasing a mobile phone service plan that includes a cap, an individual will likely 
want to know what happens when the cap is 
exceeded.   
This desire to know will be true for most 
consumers whether or not they think to ask 
the question and it is probably something 
customer should be told pursuant to Principle 
2.  Regardless of how good a company’s 
intentions are, there will still be times when consumers misapprehend a product or service in 
a way that the company, even doing due diligence, failed to foresee.  Again, this is where a 
company can use its complaint data to determine that a certain portion of people, perhaps 
from a particular demographic, continually complain that they thought a particular service 
would do a particular thing.  When this trend begins to come apparent, the business should 
then respond to the complaint data in a way that lessens the likelihood of confusion from the 
outset while providing a remedy for those individuals that felt that they had been misled. 
Principle 4 does not need a precise time limit, as different sorts of problems will take different 
amounts of time to resolve, and some are more pressing than others.  This principle is 
meant to allow for some degree of triage, where the most pressing issues are dealt with 
immediately, while still ensuring that less pressing issues are dealt with in a reasonable 
amount of time.  Further, it is meant to ensure that the outcomes are fair, which can be 
determined by examining the complaints data and how consumers feel about the outcomes. 
Principle 5 is similar to Principle 3 insofar as it relates to information, but it meant to prevent 
consumers from developing misunderstandings about products or services from the outset. 
Principle 6 is meant to ensure that those who are disadvantaged or vulnerable are not left 
out of, or treated unfairly, within the marketplace.  Complaints data is the key to making this 
determination. 
Principle 7 is meant to give some teeth to the principles by providing the ACMA with a way to 
enforce them. 
  Consumers First: Smart Regulation for Digital Australia  31 
 
Principle 8 is aimed at ensuring that internal compliance with the principles is an ongoing 
process.  It is not enough to simply create mechanisms to comply with the principles and 
then leave it at that.  As products and services change, companies will need to monitor for 
new areas of customer concern. 
Principle 9 acknowledges that consumers too have an obligation in consumer protection and 
highlights the imperative that everyone, including the customer, be straightforward and 
honest in these transactions. 
Principle 10 is meant to help customers and regulators know how well a company is 
complying with the principles.  An external auditor, such as the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority, can examine complaints data to determine where consumers routinely 
make complaints, and then look to see whether or not the business is doing anything to 
prevent such complaints in the future.  When a company routinely gets a certain type of 
complaint, the company does nothing to prevent it, and there are no mitigating factors, the 
company should be found in breach of the principles-based regulation. 
3.5.3 Outcomes 
To help companies give effect to the principles, they should focus on the following five 
outcomes (‘the Outcomes’), borrowed from the TCF initiative.   
Outcome 1:  Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with 
businesses where the fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate 
culture. 
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are 
designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted 
accordingly. 
Outcome 3: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and 
takes account of their circumstances. 
Outcome 4: Consumers are provided with products and services that perform 
as companies have led them to expect, and the associated customer service 
is also of an acceptable standard and is as they have been led to expect. 
Outcome 5: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to 
change product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a complaint. 
These outcomes are not new principles; they are simply outcomes companies should keep 
in mind.  The idea behind the outcomes is to flesh out the aims of the principles and to give 
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3.5.4 The regulatory conversation: increasing certainty and developing norms 
Braithwaite touches on the notion of “creating regulatory agency culture as a storybook 
compared to rulebooks.”142  The idea behind the concept of a storybook is that “stories 
constitute a sensibility from which action flows without reference to rules.”143  As an example 
of this concept, Braithwaite uses the example of a hotel chain: the “chain does not secure 
quality décor through décor rules, but through stories and concrete examples of abominable 
and impeccable taste that nurtures the sensibilities central to this kind of private 
regulation.”144  The idea, then, is that it is not in rules that regulators will find certainty as to 
what they ought to do, but through examples and experience of what works and what does 
not.  To illustrate the difference between the storybook and rulebook method of training 
regulators, Braithwaite quotes from Robert Kagan: 
Edward Rubin reports that the German Bundesbank's regulations for assuring 
bank safety and soundness are bound in a pamphlet less than one hundred 
pages in length. The US Federal Reserve Board's operative statues and 
regulations fill several thick binders. Officials hired by the Fed to work on bank 
regulation, aside from having a law degree or an adequate grade on a civil 
service examination, receive a few weeks of on-the-job training. The 
Bundesbank runs a three-year 'college' for its regulatory recruits. When 
regulatory officials are thoroughly trained professionals, dedicated to a career 
in the same regulatory program, Rubin notes, authorities can trust them to 
make programmatically sensible judgments and need not bind their discretion 
with detailed rules. Repeatedly, officials of multinational corporations whom 
we interviewed commented on frequency of turnover among the regulatory 
personnel they deal with in American agencies – which in turn led to 
variability in American regulators' level of technical knowledge when 
compared with their counterparts in Europe and Japan.145 
The difference in approach here is striking, with the storybook approach harking back to 
Aristotelian virtue ethics146, whereas the rulebook approach simply requires rote learning.  
There are two key points here.  First, by educating individuals as ‘regulators’ they may be 
more inclined to see themselves as regulators, rather than merely an individual who 
happens to work for a regulatory agency.  Professor Cosmo Graham makes this point in 
arguing that there is value in regulators who see themselves as individuals engaged in a 
regulatory career, rather than people who at this moment happen to work for a regulatory 
                                                
142 Braithwaite, John Bradford. 2002. “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty.” 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27: 47, 74. Available at: [Accessed July 27, 2010]. 
143 Id at 73. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Id at 74. 
146 See, e.g. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2 (“We are not studying in order to know what 
virtue is, but to become good, for otherwise there would be no profit in it”). 
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seeing themselves as career-regulators, individuals will not face the perverse incentives 
created when one is regulating the very industry one is attempting to enter.  That is to say, 
career-regulators will not worry that if they upset the regulated industry they may find it hard 
to gain employment when they defect to the private sector. 
 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this excerpt from Kagan gestures towards the 
notion of a regulatory conversation, as put forth by Julia Black.147  On this theory, there is 
value in discussing the normative outcomes that the regulation is attempting to achieve, as it 
provides both development and clarification of the norms.  Principles, rather than rules, are 
most conducive to this sort of conversation as rules preclude the conversation from taking 
place insofar as rules merely enumerate the steps one must follow or not follow.  Principles, 
on the other hand, lend themselves to a normative discussion about what sorts of acts 
constitute fairness and what practices and procedures might increase or decrease fairness. 
This conversation should not be limited to regulators, however, as it is in Kagan’s example.  
Instead, it should include regulators, customers, interest groups and businesses.  Including 
these four parties in the conversation will both increase interpretive certainty vis-à-vis 
principles and also allow for development of those principles in relation to evolving concerns 
of consumers and businesses.   
The concept of a regulatory conversation is not new.  Contrary to their appearance, rules are 
not always bright line, and whether they are clear or opaque is not so much a function of the 
text as it is a function of the way in which the text is interpreted.  As Black argues, the clarity 
of a rule is “a function of the interpretation a rule receives in a particular interpretive 
community.”148  Or, put another way, “certainty does not flow so much from objective 
features of the clarity and precision of the word in rules, as lawyers sometimes assume, but 
from shared assumptions in a regulatory community about the interpreted shape of a 
rule.”149 The clarity of a principle is much the same. 
To help provide principle-clarity, a regulator can provide formal guidance, or, as the FSA did 
with the TCF initiative, the regulator can provide informal guidance in the form of “good and 
bad practice for [businesses] to consider.”150  Such guidance can help businesses 
understand the way in which a regulator will respond to particular situations, thereby giving 
                                                
147 Julia Black, 'Talking about Regulation' (1998) Spring Public Law 77. 
148 Black, Julia. 2001. “Managing Discretion.” In ARLC Conference Papers, Sydney, p. 1, 23. 
149 Braithwaite, John Bradford. 2002. “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty.” 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27: 47, 71. Available at: [Accessed July 27, 2010]. 
150 Cluster reports. Available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Regulated/tcf/library/cluster/index.shtml [Accessed 
September 1, 2010]. 
Recommendation: The regulator should offer clear career paths for 
consumer protection professionals to strengthen the regulatory culture. 
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bad practice for [businesses] to consider.”151  Such guidance can help businesses 
understand the way in which a regulator will respond to particular situations, thereby giving 
businesses insight into how the regulator views particular actions and strategies by 
business. 
The regulatory conversation also allows consumers, through their complaints, to inform the 
debate.  Businesses can use the complaints data they collect to gain insight into the ways in 
which customers are satisfied or dissatisfied with the business, and the regulator can use 
this data to determine whether or not businesses are responding to the feedback as well as 
to identify new issues for consumers.  For example, if a new service or technology is 
generating a number of complaints across the entire industry, then it will indicate that 
perhaps the regulator needs to take affirmative action not just in relation to a particular 








3.5.5 A framework for implementation is needed 
It is not enough merely to declare a list of principles.  Nor is it enough to declare the 
principles and ask businesses to follow them.  Instead, to smooth the transition and to help 
businesses understand what is expected of them, it would be helpful for businesses to 
create a framework for enhancing consumer protection within their own companies.  To this 
end, there should be a framework for analysing the product life-cycle from the perspective of 
the customer and a framework for collecting and analysing consumer complaints.  The 
specifics of these frameworks will be covered in the sections on complaint resolution and 
regulatory enforcement. 
                                                
151 Cluster reports. Available at: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Regulated/tcf/library/cluster/index.shtml [Accessed 
September 1, 2010]. 
Recommendation: Complaint data should be used both by businesses 
and the regulator to gauge how successfully a business has 
implemented the principles. 
Recommendation: The regulator should have the power to: 
• conduct outreach with stakeholders, 
• issue formal and informal guidance and 
• develop a standard (as directed by the Minister), 
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4   COMPLAINT RESOLUTION 
 
4.1 Complaint resolution mechanisms as a part of consumer protections 
The need for complaint resolution mechanisms is best stated by Xu and Yuan, who argue 
that “[p]eople with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they want it as quickly 
and inexpensively as possible.”152 
Xu and Yuan argue that compliant resolution is properly a focus for consumer protection 
regulation because “in most cases a consumer seeking redress from a company typically 
finds him/herself engaged in a highly unequal contest.”153  This inequality arises out of (1) 
resource imbalances between individuals and companies, (2) an imbalance of rule setting 
insofar as companies will draft contracts that favour the company, and (3) an imbalance in 
negotiating power.154 
Additionally, as already argued155, complaints data (including reports and statistical data 
about the complaints) play a vital role in giving shape to the principles in general, and in 
particular to fleshing out what constitutes fairness in particular situations and for particular 
kinds of consumers.  In this way, complaint resolution serves two important needs.  First, it 
solves problems for consumers. Second, it constitutes a necessary input in the feedback 
loop that helps businesses improve their customer service and helps regulators see both 
emerging trends in consumer protection as well as which companies need to focus more on 
consumer matters. 
4.2 The benefits to business of adequate complaint handling 
Donoghue and de Klerk argue that “manufacturers and retailers should encourage a “culture 
of complaining’” in which “consumers … complain directly or formally.”156  The reason for this 
is that “[m]anufacturers and retailers can only become aware of product shortcomings and 
remedy the problem when consumers directly communicate their dissatisfaction to them,” 
otherwise companies will not have the information necessary to conform their products and 
services to the needs of the market.157  Further, the more likely consumers are to complain, 
                                                
152 Zhengchuan Xu & Yufei Yuan, Principle-based dispute resolution for consumer 
protection, 22 Knowledge-Based Systems, 18, 19 (2009). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Supra p 27. 
156 Suné Donoghue & Helena M. de Klerk, The right to be heard and to be understood: a 
conceptual framework for consumer protection in emerging economies, 33 International 
Journal of Consumer Studies 456, 463 (2009). 
157 See, e.g.   John W. Huppertz, An effort model of first-stage complaining behaviour.  16 
Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction and Complaining Behavior  132 (2003); 
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“For some telecommunications 
companies, the biggest cost may not 
be handling complaints one by one, 
but the potential loss of market share 
and [a company’s] performance in the 
… markets based on the perception 
that it’s not providing good service.” 
– Simon Cohen, Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman 
the more likely that complaints data will be representative of consumers feelings and the 
more likely that the market, and the regulator can respond appropriately. 
As an example of complaint resolution and its effect on business, consider Dell’s experience 
with customer call centres.  Sangareddy et al. write that in 2003 “Dell computers shifted 
support calls for two of its corporate computer lines from its call center in Bangalore” back to 
the United States because “customers were not satisfied with the level of technical support 
they were getting,” and this frustration with respect to phone support alienated customers.158  
Bluntly put, unhappy customers were causing Dell to forego profit from alienated customers 
who no longer wished to do business with the company.  By responding to that criticism, Dell 
was able remedy the situation, thereby being responsive to consumer complaints while also 
helping their own business. 
There is little ambiguity that quality customer service is tied to customer loyalty.  As 
Sangareddy et al. note, “The marketing literature has extensively researched the topic of 
customer satisfaction, and the studies show a 
positive and significant association between 
customer satisfaction and brand loyalty and 
repurchase intention.”159  Similarly, Strauss & Hill 
argue that “[e]ffective consumer complaint 
handling ... has been shown to increase customer 
satisfaction and build long-term relationships.”160  
Further, “[i]t is generally believed to cost more to 
gain a new customer than it does to retain an 
existing one (Blodgett et al., 1995: five times as 
much; Gummesson, 1994: five-ten times).”161  
“The importance of customer retention is clear.  Jamieson (1994) reports that a 2 per cent 
improvement in customer retention has an impact on profit equal to a 10 per cent reduction 
in overheads.  Bain & Co found that a 5 per cent increase in customer retention raised the 
value of each customer by 25-95 per cent (Reichheld, 1996).162  Therefore, there is a strong 
business argument for keeping customers and keeping them happy through quality customer 
service. 
                                                                                                                                         
Kelli Bodey & Debra Grace, Segmenting service ‘complainers’ and ‘non-complainers’ on 
the basis of consumer characteristics, 20 Journal of Services Marketing, 178 (2006). 
158 Sridhar R. Papagari Sangareddy et al., Attaining Superior Complaint Resolution, 52 
Communications of the ACM 122 (2009). 
159 Ibid. 
160 Judy Strauss & Donna J. Hill, Consumer Complaints by E-mail: An Exploratory 
Investigation of Corporate Responses and Customer Reaction, 15 Journal of Interactive 
Marketing 63, 63 (2001). 
161 Francis Buttle & Jamie Burton, Does service failure influence customer loyalty?, 1 Journal 
of Consumer Behaviour 217, 218 (2001). 
162 Ibid. 
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This data is not only for the industry’s use, however.  Complaint data informs United 
Kingdom’s Office of Communications’ (Ofcom) “policy and enforcement teams on trends in 
consumer detriment or new areas of concern and to provide evidence for Ofcom's 
programme of monitoring and enforcement.” 163 For Ofcom, “[t]he data provided is an early 
warning that there may be a consumer issue; without the data [Ofcom] would not have a 
reliable picture of the scale of problems, or the types of harm that consumers experience.”164  
In this way, Ofcom adopts the complaints-as-intelligence approach insofar as it uses 
complaint data, both about industry and about itself, to inform and improve its regulatory 
activity.165  Therefore, complaints data is valuable both to the regulated and to the regulator 
and both parties should seek to exploit it to the fullest extent possible.  The means of utilising 







4.3 Why are there complaints in the first place? 
Ouden et al. argue that the number of complaints is rising in many service industries not 
because companies are supplying inferior products, but because they are supplying 
innovative products that diverge from customer expectations.166  On this theory, when a 
customer goes to buy a pair of scissors, he or she will likely be focused on the technical 
aspect of whether or not the scissors cut paper properly.  However, when it comes to 
purchasing a mobile phone or a mobile phone service plan, the phone or the service plan 
may behave exactly as it is technically meant to, yet the phone may not have features a 
customer assumed would be there or there may be inadequate reception in a place the 
consumer often goes.  In these ‘soft failures’ the product technically works according to 
specification, but it does not do what the consumer thought; in short, these failures occur 
                                                
163 Enforcement Report: A report on Ofcom's approach to enforcement and recent activity, 
Ofcom’s 3.5 (2009). 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Elke den Ouden et al., Quality and Reliability Problems from a Consumer's Perspective: 
an Increasing Problem Overlooked by Business?, 22 Quality and Reliability Engineering 
International 821, 822 (2006). 
Recommendation: The regulator should collect and analyse complaints 
data from businesses to discover problems and trends. 
Recommendation: Businesses should publish information about 
complaints and complaint management annually. 
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“Informed agreement has to be a 
critical element of regulation in 
the industry.” 
- Simon Cohen, 
Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman 
because the customer’s information on the product or service was incomplete, and not 
because there is an actual fault with the product or service.167 
To address this problem, Ouden et al. suggest distinguishing between different types of 
consumers.  Novice users, the authors argue, 
“have high expectations based on 
advertisements, and have little interest or 
appreciation for the underlying technology, while 
experienced users understand the capabilities 
and limitations of the product much better.”168  
They further argue that because consumers have 
different expectations, the types of complaints and problems that arise will depend on the 
type of user more than the product itself.169  This means that “[u]nderstanding a complaint in 
this phase requires insight into the type of consumers that use the product and the (mis-)fit 
with their familiarity or knowledge.”170 
Businesses should recognise the need to reformulate their approaches to match different 
types of consumers, thereby reducing soft failures.  Regulators can help facilitate this 
reformulation by working with industry on (non-binding) best practices and incentivising 
business to recognise the nature of soft failures by penalising companies that fail to address 
these problems within their customer base.  To recognise that these problems exist at all, 
however, businesses will need to listen to their customers.  In doing so, the complaints data 
will further explicate consumer perspectives on fairness, thereby furthering the regulatory 
conversation on the matter.  This process will not eliminate complaints, however, and 
companies must still address consumer complaints. 
4.4 Recommendation: a lifecycle framework for principles-based complaint 
handling 
Ouden et al. suggest that much could be done to reduce consumer complaints if consumers 
were better informed about products before purchase.  A pre-emptive step in addressing 
complaints, then, would be to help avoid complaints in the first instance by ensuring that 
consumers are empowered with more comprehensible, accurate, timely, relevant and 
complete information.171  This information-as-complaint-abatement philosophy serves as the 
basis for the information sharing in Principle 2.172 
                                                
167 Elke den Ouden et al., Quality and Reliability Problems from a Consumer's Perspective: 
an Increasing Problem Overlooked by Business?, 22 Quality and Reliability Engineering 





172 See supra p 29. 
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Complaints will still arise, however, and they will need to be addressed.  According to 
Papagari Sangareddy et al., the “complaint management process is composed of three 
interrelated, yet distinct, factors: interactional justice (perceived quality of the interaction 
[between the customer and the business]), procedural justice (perceived fairness of service 
recovery procedures in cases of service problems), and distributive justice (perceived 
fairness of the outcome of the service recovery process).”173  The more satisfied consumers 
feel about the various factors, the more likely they are to be satisfied with the complaint 
resolution process as a whole.  Although these factors were present in the complaint 
resolution literature, no jurisdiction appeared to craft the redress provisions of its consumer 
protection regulation around these factors.  By focusing on improving customer experiences 
according to these metrics, businesses will at the same time improve their compliance with 
the principles because consumers will be more likely to feel as if they are being treated fairly 
by the business in question.  This, then, is an area in which principles-based regulation 
might prove particularly useful insofar as consumer protection regulation might be aimed at 
turning the three factors into principles for industry complaint resolution mechanisms. 
The FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative provides a good framework for 
complaint handling.  Recall that under TCF the FSA suggested that business adopt a 
“product life-cycle as a simple framework that firms could use to structure their thinking 
about different aspects of TCF.”174  In addition, the FSA specified certain outcomes that it 
expected businesses to achieve, ranging from customers being confident that they are 
dealing with firms where the fair treatment of customers is central to corporate culture 
(Outcome 1) to consumers not facing unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by 
businesses to change product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a complaint 
(Outcome 6).175  For the FSA, these outcomes were designed to “improve[ ] outcomes for 
retail consumers” by expanding on the concept of ‘fairness’ found in the FSA’s 11 Principles 
for Business.176  The FSA also issued various types of guidance and examples of good and 
bad behaviour by companies in an effort to help businesses interpret the Principles and 
Outcomes.  Although the FSA did not enforce the TCF initiative with sufficient gusto, the 
product life-cycle approach is a valuable one and supported by the literature.177 
                                                
173 Sridhar R. Papagari Sangareddy et al., Attaining Superior Complaint Resolution, 52 
Communications of the ACM 123 (2009). 
174 See Financial Services Authority, supra n 71. 
175 See Financial Services Authority, supra n 79. 
176 Financial Services Authority. 2006. 1, Treating customers fairly - towards fair outcomes 
for consumers. FSA. 
177 See generally, Moschis, G.P. (1987) Consumer Socialization: A Life-Cycle Perspective. 
Lexington, Boston, MA.; see also e.g. Donoghue, Suné, and Helena M. de Klerk. 2009. 
“The right to be heard and to be understood: a conceptual framework for consumer 
protection in emerging economies.” International Journal of Consumer Studies 33: 456, 
457 (“We argue that it is not only about complaint handling but, especially in the case of 
new and emerging consumer communities, about understanding from the consumer’s 
point of view, the entire purchasing process, including consumers’ expectations about 
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For example, following the FSA’s lead, a regulator might inform businesses that they need to 
examine, inter alia, product design and governance, target markets, marketing and 
promotion, sales and advice, post-sales information and services and finally complaint 
handling.178  Although a business should be required to look at these matters, it is up to the 
company to determine how important each matter is for its business and how it will respond 
to improve consumer outcomes on these points. 
Such a framework should be designed to help and encourage businesses to reach the 
outcomes specified by the regulatory principles.  This can be done without adding any 
further rules or principles, leaving it entirely to businesses to construct their own method for 
achieving the desired outcomes.  However the experience of the FSA indicates that it is 
beneficial to at least specify certain milestones for businesses to meet.  These milestones 
need not specify the precise method by which a company should meet a regulatory 
objective, but a milestone might state, for example, the date by which businesses must have 
a plan of action for meeting the objectives, and a date by which businesses must implement 
that plan. 
To aid businesses in meeting these objectives, there should be an ongoing conversation 
between the regulator and the businesses during this process, with the regulator 
“publish[ing] implementation reviews including case studies and examples of good and poor 
practices.”179  The notion of a conversation is an important one.  This must go beyond mere 
“supervision and inspection” and it should constitute “close engagement of regulator and 
regulated … in elaborating on the meaning and application” of the principles.180  In this way, 
the regulator must take a leadership role not only to start the conversation among 
stakeholders, but also to keep the conversation going so that businesses are talking to each 
other, individuals and interest groups, as well as to the regulator. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
product performance, the dissatisfaction with the product performance, the decision to 
complain and the accompanying reasoning and emotions) and Opinion Leader, 2010, 1, 5 
Consumer perceptions of fairness within financial services (adopting an approach to 
assessing ‘fairness’ that “explore[s] fairness in detail which tracked the various stages of 
the consumer journey in financial services from exposure to marketing and 
communications, through the sales process, post-sales and the resolution of any 
problems or complaints”). 
178 Financial Services Authority. 2006. 1, 6 Treating customers fairly - towards fair outcomes 
for consumers. FSA. 
179 Black, Julia. 2008. “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation.” LSE Law, 
Society and Economy. 1, 21, Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267722 [Accessed 
July 22, 2010]. 
180 Ibid. 
Recommendation: The regulator should engage with businesses and 
issue guidance and best practice guidelines to help businesses to 
develop a consumer protection framework that covers the lifecycle of 
their products and services. 









Focusing on the product lifecycle has two purposes in consumer protection.  In the first 
place, it allows companies to fully understand the manner in which consumers experience 
their products prior to the initiation of a complaint through to the entire complaint handling 
experience.  Second, it serves as a lens through which a company can help focus its culture 
on consumer welfare. 
4.4.1 First benefit of a lifecycle framework 
Seeing a product or service from a consumer perspective is vital to understanding consumer 
complaints.  The reason for this is that “prior to purchasing and consuming products, 
consumers form expectations regarding the performance of such products in a particular use 
situation.”181  Then, once the consumers are using a product or service, they then “evaluate 
its perceived performance in terms of their initial expectations regarding the performance of 
the product.”182  If the initial impression of the product is off, the entire relationship between 
customer and business is off to a bad start.   
By focusing on the advertising and sales stage of a product or service, a business will be 
better able to see the ways in which consumers gain inaccurate understandings of products 
and services.  Armed with this knowledge, a business is better positioned to reduce the 
frequency of such misunderstandings, which benefits both the business and the consumer, 
as previously shown.183 
In the 2010 survey of consumer perceptions of fairness, initiated by Ofcom, fairness was 
equally important to consumers as the “nuts and bolts” of a product, which is to say, whether 
it functions properly or offers value for money.184 
                                                
181 Donoghue, Suné, and Helena M. de Klerk. 2009. “The right to be heard and to be 
understood: a conceptual framework for consumer protection in emerging economies.” 
International Journal of Consumer Studies 33: 456, 457. 
182 Ibid. 
183 See Francis Buttle & Jamie Burton, supra n 161. 
184 Opinion Leader. 2010. 1, 13 Consumer perceptions of fairness within financial services. 
Recommendation: Customer protection frameworks should include 
strategies for maintaining fairness and achieving the Outcomes in all 
interactions with customers. 
Recommendation: To help businesses construct their customer 
protection frameworks, the ACMA should create advisory groups 
consisting of the various stakeholders and publish case studies and 
statements of good and poor practice to help build an interpretive 
community around the principles-based code. 
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4.4.2 Second benefit of a lifecycle framework 
The other important aspect of the life-cycle approach is that it helps companies internalise 
norms of consumer protection into corporate culture.  As Julia Black notes, “regulation is 
only fully effective if it is internalised.”185  Black ties internalisation of norms back to the 
notion of an interpretive community, arguing that although “the development of an 
interpretive community does not mean regulation has been institutionalised … interpretive 
communities [are] part of the institutionalisation process.” Christine Parker suggests that to 
there are three stages to internalisation: commitment to principles, development of the skills 
and knowledge to deliver outcomes in line with the principles, and institutionalisation of the 
process.186  A framework for examining a product’s life-cycle with the purpose of continually 
meeting a set of principles meets all three stages.  The first stage is necessarily met with 
principles-based regulation that is imposed upon a business.  The second stage comes out 
of the regulatory conversation that surrounds the framework a company will use to meet the 
expected outcomes outlined in the principles.  Finally, institutionalisation of the process will 
happen insofar as companies will be required—through mechanisms of their own design—to 
meet certain principles-based outcomes, and part of meeting these outcomes is tied to 
examination of a product’s life-cycle from the consumer perspective. 
4.4.3 A lifecycle framework is not itself sufficient to guarantee consumer protection  
It is important to note that simply by adopting a lifecycle framework for their goods and 
services a company will not necessarily have done enough to protect the consumer interest.  
It is important to remember that the goal of this framework is to help companies place 
consumer protection at the core of their businesses.  To that end, management should help 
identify instances where consumers may be disadvantaged and address them.  Similarly, 
key performance indicators for marketing staff should provide incentives for clear and 
accurate marketing campaigns which generate fewer complaints.  By taking these actions, a 
company can ensure that the lifecycle framework will operate effectively to protect 







                                                
185 Black, Julia. 2001. “Managing Discretion.” In ARLC Conference Papers, Sydney, p. 1, 32. 
186 See generally, Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Self Regulation and Corporate 
Citizenship. 
Recommendation: Management should be more involved in marketing 
campaigns and advertising, and key performance indicators for 
marketing staff should be tied to whether or not their campaigns 
generate consumer satisfaction or confusion and complaints. 
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Although regulation should be principles-based, there is still a need for rules to buttress the 
Principles.  For example, when a customer purchases a product, they should be informed of 
their right to redress through the company’s internal complaints system and the mechanism 
by which that complaint can be taken an independent third party, such as the 
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO).  When a consumer complains, he or she 
should be reminded of the process and notified of their various rights (e.g. within how many 
days the complaint should be handled, and after how many days the complaint can be taken 
to the TIO).  
Businesses should also produce ‘key fact’ documents so consumer are well informed about 
a product or service (e.g. for a mobile phone plan with a cap key facts might include what the 








Recommendation: To empower consumers, they should be informed of 
their options to escalate a complaint when first they complain. 
Recommendation: To best protect consumers, business should produce 
‘key fact’ documents that contain essential information that customers 
should know about a product or service. 
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5   REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT  
 
5.1 The importance of enforcement 
As discussed earlier in respect of principles-based regulation and complaint handling, 
regulatory enforcement is of paramount importance.  Regardless of how good a regulatory 
scheme is in theory, it will not serve consumers unless there is effective regulatory action to 
support the objective of the law on the books. 
 
 
To understand regulatory enforcement it is necessary to understand consumer protection.  
For Averitt and Lande, “effective consumer choice requires two things: options in the 
marketplace, and the ability to choose freely among them.”187  “What we ask of consumer 
protection law, is, therefore, something relatively modest.  We ask that consumers be 
enabled to make rational choices to the extent that they wish to concentrate on doing so.”188  
This plain view of consumer protection ignores lessons learned from complaint resolution, 
however.  As Ouden et al. have argued, consumers come to the table with a certain set of 
expectations that may not match the realities of the product or service.189  Ouden shows us 
that even if there are multiple options and people can choose freely between those options, 
people’s expectations will often not match the facts regarding the abilities of the product or 
service.  If this view is correct—and it seems to be—then  consumer protection must do 
more than merely provide options and free choice—businesses must ensure that customers 
are actively and directly provided with adequate information to make informed decisions in 
their own interest.  In this way, consumer protection law and enforcement cannot be 
contained entirely within competition law, as competition law neglects the informational 
aspects of the market.  Consequently, consumer protection enforcement must be more 
robust than merely enforcing competition laws that protect an economically efficient market. 
Strünck supports the argument that the market alone, even if well-functioning with multiple 
options and freedom of choice, is insufficient to provide adequate enforcement mechanisms.  
For Strünck: 
Following economic theories of law, breaches of consumer law or 
corporate misconduct are not very likely to be sanctioned… 
Especially in the case of small claims individual consumers are not 
willing to sue or accept any other burden. Thus if no other actor steps 
in to enforce the law it will remain ineffective. Even if consumers 
                                                
187 Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust 
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 Antitrust Law Journal 713, 716-717 (1996). 
188 Ibid. 
189 Elke den Ouden et al. 
Recommendation: The regulator should audit businesses regularly for 
compliance with the Principles. 
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were willing to sue they would be facing a time and money 
consuming procedure which would deter a lot of possible plaintiffs.  
As a result, markets do not work properly because they reward 
inefficiency and even fraud.190 
Consequently, additional enforcement mechanisms are necessary besides those that 
protect a competitive market, for freedom of choice simply is not enough to guarantee 
that consumers have positive outcomes. 
The literature on regulatory enforcement and complaint resolution overlap to some degree.  
This is because certain methods of resolving complaints (e.g. arbitration) are also used as 
mechanisms to enforce regulation.  In Europe for example, (i) direct negotiation, (ii) 
mediation and arbitration, (iii) small claims procedures, (iv) collective action for damages and 
(v) actions for injunctive relief are the most common methods of consumer redress, while at 
the same time they are used as means of enforcement.191 
Interestingly, since 2006, European Union member states “no longer have the choice to put 
enforcement in the hands of private … bodies” only, as they must “grant public bodies legal 
rights to take action.”192  Such a change echoes concerns that “without the control offered by 
third party complaint handlers, sellers would have a monopoly on complaint handling and 
would be able to impose their own standards on complaint cases.”193  This indicates that 
giving public bodies legal standing to take action can help overcome the problem of 
transaction costs for individual consumers who are harmed, but not enough to make them 
take individual action.  Where there are trends that are evident from compliance data or 
other sources, then interest groups should be able to make complaints regarding systemic or 
wide-scale problems, sometimes called ‘super-complaints.’ 
5.2 Proactive and reactive enforcement 
Faure et al. contrast proactive regulation (ex ante) with reactive regulation (ex post) in 
enforcing consumer protection law.194  In the United Kingdom, for example, compliance 
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(2008). 
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194 Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen, Enforcement Practices for 
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monitoring tends towards using risk assessment to target oversight in perceived vulnerable 
areas of the market.195  Although Australia and Belgium also use targeted enforcement, 
these jurisdictions show that targeted enforcement can be done without formal risk models 
(e.g. by relying on the number of complaints in a specific sector).196  This approach dovetails 
nicely with the complaints model of enforcement mentioned earlier197 in which consumer 
complaints are used to determine whether or not consumers feel they are being treated fairly 
in particular situations and for particular kinds of consumers. 
Reactive enforcement, according to Faure et al., is “[p]lausible only in countries where there 
is a strong culture of consumer activism,” such as the Netherlands, where consumers are 
aware of their options (such as ADR committees) and where industry bodies are willing to 
“take the initiative in publicising potential problems and seeking out defaulting traders.”198  
Curiously, although the Netherlands relies on reactive enforcement, 80 per cent of 
Netherlanders agree with the statement, “You trust public authorities to protect your rights as 
a consumer.”199  This was the highest result in the EU-wide survey and indicates that 
reactive enforcement can protect consumers, so long as the enforcement is strong and in 
the consumer interest. 
5.3 Enforcement schemes 
When assessing a breach, one option is to ‘go easier’ on parties with good compliance 
regimes.  As Parker points out, “[i]n Australian trade practices regulation the courts have 
repeatedly discounted damages for breach where an effective compliance system exists, 
and the ACCC regularly negotiates settlements and/or damages on this basis.”200  The idea 
here is that the “carrot” of gentler enforcement will be an incentive firms to build up and 
maintain their own compliance mechanisms.  With these mechanisms in place and 
functioning properly, the thinking is that consumers will be better off as a consequence of 
firms trying to avoid harsher treatment at the hands of the regulator.  Here too there is a 
similarity with principles-based regulation and allowing firms to develop their own process for 
ensuring that they protect the consumer interest.  However, these compliance systems must 
be closely scrutinised, and if there is evidence to indicate that they are inadequate, the 
regulator should take action and compel companies to bring their compliance systems up to 
an acceptable level for consumers.  Failure to do so should result in the regulator imposing 
financial penalties. 
                                                
195 Id at 399. 
196 Ibid. 
197 See supra p 28. 
198 Ibid. 
199 European Commission, Consumer protection in the Internal Market, 95 (2006), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs252_en.pdf. 
200 Chrintine Parker, Is there a reliable way to evaluate organisational compliance 
programs?, 1, 4 (2002). 
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Another mechanism for consumer protection is simply to leave enforcement to the courts.  
Although the United States has the Federal Trade Commission (which provides consumer 
protection by way of its ability to assess penalties and bring court actions), there is also a 
strong reliance on the combination of class action lawsuits (a kind of collective enforcement) 
when it comes to enforcement of consumer protection regulation. 201  By relying on class 
actions and the ability for winning plaintiffs to collect attorneys’ fees from losing defendants, 
plaintiffs have an incentive to bring class action law suits even when individual members 
alone have insufficient incentive. 
In arguing for increased collective enforcement capacity in Europe, Boom and Loos argue 
that: 
Individual consumers are ill-equipped to enforce their legal rights. 
They stand isolated against companies and organizations which 
often have better legal support and resources. This may result in 
individual consumers abstaining from pursuing their legal 
entitlements...  Conversely, organized consumers, be they 
represented by private organizations or public authorities, may 
challenge traders on more equal footing. Centralization of individual 
consumers’ interests and aggregation of individual consumers’ 
claims may help to create bargaining power that isolated individual 
consumers lack when complaining and claiming individually. 
Collective enforcement of consumer law may therefore be more 
effective.202  
Still, many are sceptical of American-style class actions, perhaps because “European 
models, especially the Dutch and Scandinavian, have privileged negotiation over 
adjudication as a mechanism for resolving disputes.”203  Indeed, in 2007 at a 
conference on collective redress, the European Commissioner for Consumer 
Protection, Neelie Kroes, stated, “To those who have come all the way to Lisbon to 
hear the words ‘class action’, let me be clear from the start:  there will not be any.  Not 
in Europe, not under my watch.”204  Therefore, although the class action model of 
consumer protection plays a key role in some jurisdictions, such as the United States, 
it is not universally accepted because of its adversarial nature. 
                                                
201 Christoph Strünck, Claiming Consumers' Rights: Patterns and Limits of adversarial 
Legalism in European Consumer Protection, 4 German Policy Studies 167, 168 (2008). 
202 William van Boom & Marco Loos, Effective enforcement of consumer law in Europe 
(2007), 1, 1 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913. 
203 Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Enfocrement of Consumer Law: A 
Framework for Comparative Assessment, 3 European Review of Private Law 391, 425 
(2008). 
204 Christoph Strünck, Claiming Consumers' Rights: Patterns and Limits of adversarial 
Legalism in European Consumer Protection, 4 German Policy Studies 167, 167 (2008). 
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Empowering government agencies or public service organisations to enforce private rights is 
another means to achieve regulatory compliance, enforcement and to obtain redress for 
small harms that individual consumers may not pursue.  Van Boom and Loos state that:  
Recently, there have been experiments with in between solutions for 
the benefit of generating compliance with consumer law. A notable 
form of such a solution is the empowerment of public agencies to 
enforce private law rights for the benefit of the public.  For instance, 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) can file for injunctive relief with 
regard to unfair terms in consumer contracts for the benefit of 
consumers at large.  Not surprisingly, the same applies for its Dutch 
counterpart.205 
This approach gives the benefits of class action lawsuits (regulatory compliance, 
enforcement and redress for complaints that may not otherwise see the inside of a 
court room) without the disadvantages of class action lawsuits: a litigious culture, 
expense, opportunity cost and the risk of opportunistic cases being mounted. 
In the Netherlands there is “a very generous position on interest group standing with regard 
to both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and declaratory relief.”206  In other nations, 
such as Germany, interest groups only have standing in relation to particular statutory 
provisions, rather than a general right as in the Netherlands.207  The movement may be 
towards more generalised standing rules for interest groups, however, as “suggestions for a 
more general statutory framework have been voiced” in Germany and a “similar picture 
emerges from England and Wales.”208  This indicates that although there has not been a 
complete embracement of U.S.-style class actions, there is a growing trend towards support 
for collective action to obtain redress on behalf of consumers. 
Apart from allowing generalised standing for interest groups and the ability to obtain an 
injunction, “it has been suggested that interest groups should be allowed to claim exemplary 
damages or some other form of damages in excess of damages detriment or loss suffered 
by an individual plaintiff (e.g. damage to ‘consumer interests’) and put these into a fund. With 
this fund these interest groups could then finance future litigation in the common interest.”209  
This approach has the benefit of being at least partially self-funding and also increases the 
incentive for business to comply with regulation.  In short, exemplary damages help reduce 
the chance that a business may make calculated decisions to extract as much rent as 
possible before an injunction restrains them from doing so in situations where economic 
                                                
205 William van Boom & Marco Loos, Effective enforcement of consumer law in Europe 
(2007), 1, 15 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913. 
206 William van Boom & Marco Loos, Effective enforcement of consumer law in Europe 1, 11 
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Id at 14. 
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damage to individuals is not easily determined or acted on by individuals (e.g. in cases of 
misleading advertising). 
Hodges disagrees with this approach, however, as such collective action “raises not only 
issues of accountability, legitimacy, and transparency, but may also bring about frivolous and 
disproportionate enforcement activity and cause overdeterrence.”210  Instead, “Hodges 
suggests a working model in which private entities do the ‘barking’ (e.g. by lodging 
complaints in an administrative procedure before a public authority) while the ‘biting’ (fining, 
claiming, injunction) remains the public authority’s prerogative.”211 
Another method for enhancing regulatory enforcement is to enable consumer activism.  
Faure et al. outline what they see as the “principal procedural methods of enabling consumer 
activism to complement and enhance the public enforcement of regulatory contraventions:” 
(i) enabling the consumer to initiate administrative proceedings for a regulatory 
contravention, (ii) enabling the consumer to lay an information which will lead to a criminal 
prosecution for a regulatory contravention and (iii) enabling a consumer to combine a private 
right claim with administrative or criminal proceedings.212  Such an approach is meant to give 
individuals the ability obtain redress through adjudication, but the incentive for any one 
individual to do so may not be sufficiently high for an individual to take action. 
Van Boom & Loos argue for a blended approach to enforcement that includes private action, 
interest group empowerment, ombudsmen and active government agencies.213  Such an 
approach closely matches that of the Nordic countries, which according to a recent EU-wide 
survey, are the most satisfied with their national consumer protection measures.214 
The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) plays an important and beneficial role 
to protect consumers. The inquisitorial model whereby the Ombudsman investigates 
complaints is consumer friendly.  Unfortunately, it appears that some business may sit on 
complaints, risking a customer complaint to the TIO either because it is less expensive than 
dealing with the complaint directly or in the hope that a customer may become frustrated and 
give up the complaint.   
The TIO process should also be streamlined from the perspective of the consumer so that 
consumers do not need to recontact the TIO if the provider and customer cannot reach an 
agreement once the TIO has referred the matter back to the provider. 
                                                
210 Quoted in William van Boom & Marco Loos, Effective enforcement of consumer law in 
Europe 1, 15 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen, Enforcement Practices for Breaches of 
Consumer Protection Legislation, 20 Loyola Consumer Law Review 361, 372 (2007). 
213 William van Boom & Marco Loos, Effective enforcement of consumer law in Europe 1, 16 
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913. 
214 European Commission, Consumer protection in the Internal Market (2006), 85-6 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs252_en.pdf. 
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Recommendation: The rates charged by the TIO at the first tier should be increased to 
provide a greater disincentive to companies that allow complaints to go unresolved. 
Recommendation: To keep the obligations of business and the regulator aligned, and to 
expedite complaint resolution, the timelines for business to respond to complaints should 
also apply to the TIO. 
Recommendation: To ensure consistency between the TIO and ACMA, they should 
initiate conversations and collaboration to ensure interpretations of the Principles do not 
differ. 
Recommendation: When the TIO refers the matter back to the company, the TIO should 
follow up with the consumer to see that he or she is satisfied.  
Recommendation: The Ombudsman model should be retained. 
Recommendation: The determinations of the TIO should be binding on businesses, but 
not on the consumer (when a consumer complains to the TIO, the consumer should not 
be precluded from pursing legal action through the courts). 
Recommendation: Consumer groups should have standing to bring complaints before the 
TIO on behalf of aggrieved consumers.  This standing will help resolve collective action 
problems in instances where many people are harmed, but not to the degree that they 
take action independently. 
 
5.4 Recommendation: A framework for regulatory enforcement 
The blended approach by Van Boom & Loos is recommended as the best option.  Not only 
does it offer multiple means of enforcement as protection against a single point of failure, but 
it has empirical merit insofar as it used by countries in which citizens are highly satisfied with 
their consumer protection regimes.  Also, this framework can apply well in Australia as it is 
the approach Australia already takes, but to an insufficient degree.  However, more clearly 
defined roles for regulators are required, enforcement itself needs to be stronger, and 




Socialisation of norms in regulatory agencies is integral to regulation.  As Julia Black argues, 
“All the studies conducted show that socialisation into the norms of the organisation, peer 
pressure and images of what constituted a ‘good’ enforcement officer play an extremely 
Recommendation: Continue with the blended approach to enforcement 
in which there is a regulatory agency with enforcement power, an 
ombudsman to whom consumers can take complaints and the courts. 
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strong role in affecting the type of enforcement approach an officer is likely to have.”215  At 
least part of what creates these norms is the goal of the regulator.  If, as was the case with 
the FSA, there are potentially conflicting goals between, for example, promoting economic 
efficiency and promoting consumer welfare, there is the possibility that employees will be 
socialised to subordinate one interest to the other. 
With respect to the FSA, the U.K. Government appears to believe that the FSA subordinated 
consumer protection to economic efficiency.  The government creating a new agency, the 
Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) to oversee consumer protection.216  
Indeed, the Government believes that “it is impractical for the FSA to deal with issues as 
wide-ranging as the soundness of global investment banks and the treatment of customers 
at a high street level. It intends that the CPMA will be able to focus more effectively on its 
two roles – customer protection and market regulation.”217  In being able to focus on a core 
mission of consumer protection and the integrity of the market, the CPMA is more likely to 
have a culture conducive to the public interest. 
Therefore, as a first step towards enforcing principles-based regulation, the ACMA’s 
Content, Consumer and Citizen division needs to be given a clear mandate to take a 
stringent licensing role in ensuring that consumer interest is protected when licensing 
business and also a mandate to inspect and audit businesses to ensure compliance, to 
conduct outreach with stakeholders, to issue formal and informal guidance and to take 
enforcement measures including financial penalties, injunctions, and suspension or 
cancellation of license against businesses that fail to meet the requirements of the 
principles-based regulation. Or, failing this, a new and independent consumer protection 




Compliance with the principles requires that there be a clear understanding of who has 
control over the interpretation of a principle.  True, there must be a regulatory conversation 
about these principles, and the conversation must include the regulator, the industry and 
consumers.  However, this regulation exists within a business climate and at times 
businesses may have commercial, or perhaps principled reasons, for challenging the 
ACMA’s interpretation of a principle. 
                                                
215 Black, Julia. 2001. “Managing Discretion.” In ARLC Conference Papers, Sydney, p. 1, 13; 
see also, Hutter 1988, 1997; Richardson et al, 1983; Hawkins 1984; Kelman 1984; 
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216 Five Questions About: The new consumer protection authority. Available at: 
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217 Ibid. 
Recommendation: The ACMA should establish a division with a clear 
and specific single mandate to protect consumers. 






Enforcement itself should begin with negotiation and education, but if the business “still does 
not deliver substantive compliance regulators should gradually move up the enforcement 
pyramid, applying sanctions of increasing severity until they do.”218  The idea behind an 
‘enforcement pyramid’ is that the regulator starts of gently at the base of the pyramid in an 
attempt to work with the business to right the wrong.  However, if this approach does not 
work, the regulator can move up the pyramid towards a more coercive method of 







                                 Figure 1: Regulatory pyramid by Ayres and Braithwaite 
In the first instance, a regulator will attempt to persuade a non-compliant business to comply.  
Failing that, it will issue a public warning letter, then a civil penalty, and so on up the 
pyramid. 
This approach raises a few important issues.  First, the approach itself says nothing about 
where the initial stage on the pyramid ought to be.  One might assume that the first approach 
should always be persuasion, but in particularly egregious examples of non-compliance a 
fine might be more appropriate.220  Second, it is not clear if the pyramid is lexically ordered, 
which is to say, the model does not indicate whether or not a regulator can skip a stage on 
the pyramid, again, perhaps, in response to egregious behaviour.221  For practical reasons, 
                                                
218 Black, Julia. 2008. “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation.” LSE Law, 
Society and Economy. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267722, 1, 19 [Accessed 
July 22, 2010]; see also generally, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
219 Black, Julia. 2001. “Managing Discretion.” In ARLC Conference Papers, Sydney, p. 1, 18. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
Recommendation: The regulator should have interpretive control over 
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(e.g. in the case of outright fraud) the ACMA should be able to skip steps on the pyramid or 
start higher up on the pyramid. 
For example, in a particular scenario the ACMA might take the steps depicted in the pyramid 











                                                      Figure 2: Proposed regulatory pyramid 
When a business shows that it is genuinely committed to improving its compliance, the 
regulator should reward the business by moving back down the enforcement pyramid.  It is 
imperative, however, that the regulator be willing to move up the pyramid in the first place 
and not perpetually engage in persuasion, warning letters, or injunctions if they are not 
achieving compliant results.  The threat of sanctions only works when the threat is credible, 
and, as previously stated, if a company knows that at worst it will face an injunction, it may 
make a calculated business decision to act contrary to the regulation to extract rents for as 
long as possible.222  This situation must be avoided, which means that the regulator must be 









To aid in enforcement, interest groups should be able to file formal complaints with the 
regulator, even if these groups would not meet ordinary standing requirements.  This helps 
to solve the collective action problem associated with many small infractions and it also 
                                                
222 Id at 8. 
Recommendation: The regulator should adopt a more stringent 
approach to the regulatory pyramid in which the sanctions, including 
penalties, are available and are used as necessary as a disincentive to 
non-compliance. 
Recommendation: The regulator should publish the outcomes of its 
compliance and regulatory activities. 
Recommendation: The regulator should have the power to order 







Public warning letter 
Persuasion 
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Further, for a regulator to take effective enforcement action it should (i) “have clear and 
adequate power”, (ii) “be properly resourced and independent” and (iii) “have clear policies 
and procedures to address the most significant risks in the sector [it] regulate[s]”.223  With 
respect to having clear and adequate power, the regulator must have access to a full range 
of remedies for non-compliant companies and it must be clear about the situations in which 
the regulator can use that power.  With respect to consumer protection, the full force of the 
regulator’s remedies should be available in issues of consumer protection; were it otherwise, 
the very objective of consumer protection would be undermined because the regulator would 

















                                                
223 CHOICE, Good Practice in Consumer Protection Enforcement: A Review of 12 Australian 
Regulators at 12, 2008. 
Recommendation: Consumer groups should have standing to bring 
complaints to the regulator on behalf of aggrieved consumers. 
 
Recommendation: The regulator should be able to: 
• impose licence conditions, 
• issue infringement notices, 
• accept enforceable undertakings, 
• take enforcement measures when necessary, including financial 
penalties, 
• commence proceedings to seek remedies and injunctions, 
• gather information and 
• grant, suspend or revoke licenses of businesses that fail to meet 
the requirements of the Principles. 
 
Recommendation: Schedule 1, Part 7 of the Telecommunications 
Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer Safeguards) Bill 
2009 should be enacted because it will empower the ACMA to issue 
infringement notices for contraventions of regulatory civil penalty 
provisions. 
 
Recommendation: The regulator should consider a company’s ability to 
meet the consumer protection obligations when determining whether or 
not to grant a licence.  Further, the ACMA should include consideration 
of a business’s ability to provide consumer protection as a condition for 
granting a license and be willing to suspend or revoke the license of a 
business that repeatedly fails to comply. 









Recommendation: The regulator should integrate compliance with the 
Principles based regulation into licence conditions. 
 
Recommendation: The regulator should require businesses to train staff 
about the principles as a condition of compliance. 
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6   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
SMART REGULATION FOR DIGITAL AUSTRALIA 
 
6.1 Background 
Principles-based consumer protection regulation should be adopted because it shifts the 
focus of regulation on to outcomes that benefit consumers.  Principles-based regulation 
makes it clear that outcomes are what matter.  These principles are designed to produce 
outcomes that are in the consumer interest.  Principles-based regulation helps to avoid 
regulatory loopholes that comply with the letter, but not the intention, of the law.  It also 
makes service providers more accountable because they must produce demonstrably 
compliant outcomes rather than merely comply with prescriptive rules.  At the same time, 
principles-based regulation allows for business flexibility, as this regulatory approach does 
not impose a labyrinth of prescriptive rules on a business.  Rather, principles-based 
regulation tells businesses to apply the principles and achieve the resulting outcomes in 
whatever way is most efficient for each of them. 
It is important to note that while principles should be central to regulation, some prescriptive 
rules will still be required to buttress the principles. Regulatory schemes are not a 
doctrinaire, all or nothing game. 
As a starting point for implementing the principles, the adoption of a lifecycle framework for 
products and services can help businesses to gain better insight into their business from the 
perspective of the customer. By adopting a lifecycle approach to products and services, 
businesses will be better able to understand both where service failures may occur and the 
needs customers. 
Regulation, however well intentioned, may founder for lack of enforcement.  To prevent this, 
not only must a regulator have a full complement of tools at its disposal, but it must also 
have a clear mission and a culture centred on that mission.  The following recommendations 
are in the consumer interest.  These recommendations empower the regulator and give the 
regulator and the stakeholders the flexibility to implement and maintain effective regulation 
that keeps pace with changing markets. 
6.2 The Proposed Principles 
Principle 1: Businesses must treat their customers fairly. 
Principle 2: Businesses must respect the privacy of their customers. 
Principle 3: Businesses must provide their customers with clear, accurate and 
relevant information on products and services before, during and, where appropriate, 
after the point of sale. 
Principle 4: Businesses must resolve customer disputes quickly and fairly. 
Principle 5: Businesses must ensure that advertising and promotion of products and 
services is clear, accurate and not misleading. 
  Consumers First: Smart Regulation for Digital Australia  57 
 
Principle 6: Businesses must have appropriate policies and practices in place to 
assist customers who are disadvantaged or vulnerable. 
Principle 7: A business that breaches the principles-based regulation will provide an 
effective remedy for the customer and may be liable to an effective sanction. 
Principle 8: Businesses will develop ongoing monitoring and reporting measures 
designed to ensure successful implementation of the principles-based regulation. 
Principle 9: Customers will behave honestly in their dealings with businesses and 
cooperate with businesses when seeking to resolve any problems or disputes. 
Principle 10: For transparency and accountability, businesses will have their 
compliance with the principles-based regulation reviewed and reported by an 
external auditor. 
To help give effect to the principles, businesses should focus on achieving the following five 
outcomes, which are adapted from the U.K. Financial Services Authority’s Treating 
Customers Fairly initiative.  These outcomes are not new principles or requirements.  They 
are goals to help businesses flesh out the objectives of the principles.  
Outcome 1:  Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with businesses 
where the fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate culture. 
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are 
designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted 
accordingly. 
Outcome 3: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes 
account of their circumstances. 
Outcome 4: Consumers are provided with products and services that perform as 
companies have led them to expect, and the associated customer service is also of 
an acceptable standard and is as they have been led to expect. 
Outcome 5: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers to change 
product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a complaint. 
6.3 The ACMA and enforcement 
A regulatory scheme cannot work if the regulator charged with enforcing that scheme does 
not have sufficient resources and power to compel compliance with the scheme when 
necessary.  Further, the regulator should not be charged dual missions, such as trying to 
encouraging market efficiency and protecting consumers, because of the risk that one 
mission may subordinate the other.  Dual missions may harm a regulator’s ability to 
engender a cohesive culture focused on a singular regulatory goal. We recommend: 
• The ACMA should establish a division with a clear and specific single mandate to 
protect consumers, with sufficient powers, including the power to: 
i) audit businesses regularly for compliance with the principles, 
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ii) collect and analyse complaints data from businesses to discover problems and 
trends, 
iii) conduct outreach with stakeholders, 
iv) accept enforceable undertakings, 
v) issue formal and informal guidance, 
vi) impose licence conditions, 
vii) issue infringement notices, 
viii) develop a standard (as directed by the Minister), 
ix) take enforcement measures when necessary, including financial penalties, 
x) commence proceedings to seek remedies and injunctions, 
xi) gather information and 
xii) grant, suspend or revoke licenses of businesses that fail to meet the 
requirements of the Principles (see below).   
 
Should ACMA not be constituted to establish a dedicated consumer protection division in 
this way, a new and independent consumer protection authority with a single mandate and 
with the powers to enforce consumer protection should be established. 
 
• The ACMA should offer clear career paths for consumer protection professionals to 
strengthen the regulatory culture. 
• Schedule 1, Part 7 of the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition 
and Consumer Safeguards) Bill 2009 should be enacted because it will empower the 
ACMA to issue infringement notices for contraventions of regulatory civil penalty 
provisions.  Without such notices, the ACMA must go to a court to enforce a financial 
penalty on a business that has breached the regulations. 
• The regulator should consider a company’s ability to meet the consumer protection 
obligations when determining whether or not to grant a licence.  Further, the ACMA 
should include consideration of a business’s ability to provide consumer protection as 
a condition for granting a license and be willing to suspend or revoke the license of a 
business which repeatedly fails to comply. 
• The regulator should integrate compliance with the Principles based regulation into 
licence conditions. 
• The regulator should require businesses to train staff about the principles as a 
condition of compliance. 
• Consumer groups should have standing to bring complaints to the regulator on behalf 
of aggrieved consumers.  This standing will help resolve collective action problems in 
instances where many people are harmed, but not to the degree that they take action 
independently. 
• Continue with the blended approach to enforcement in which there is a regulatory 
agency with enforcement power, an ombudsman to whom consumers can take 
complaints and the courts. 
• The regulator should have interpretive control over the principles, subject to judicial 
review on the grounds of procedural fairness. 
• The regulator should adopt a more stringent approach to the regulatory pyramid in 
which the sanctions, including penalties, are available and are used as necessary as 
a disincentive to non-compliance. 
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• To ensure consistency between the TIO and ACMA, they should initiate 
conversations and collaboration to ensure interpretations of the Principles do not 
differ. 
• The regulator should publish the outcomes of its compliance and regulatory activities. 
• The regulator should have the power to order businesses to pay compensation to 
consumers.  
6.4 The TIO 
The TIO plays an essential role in dealing with consumer complaints that have not been 
resolved with businesses. 
• The inquisitorial model, whereby the TIO investigates complaints, is consumer 
friendly.  It does not require consumers to conduct their own investigation and gather 
evidence.  Arbitration, on the other hand, requires this from consumers, and so raises 
unnecessary barriers for consumers who make complaints.  The TIO inquisitorial 
model is good for consumers and should be kept. 
• To provide more certainty to business and consumers about how the TIO will 
interpret particular circumstances, the TIO should publish important determinations 
and should regard its own decisions as persuasive authority.  In cases where the TIO 
departs from its own precedent, it should provide clearly stated reasons.  
Determinations that indicate changes in interpretive policy should be published, with 
anonymised data, so that consumers and industry will understand the change in 
interpretation. 
• To keep the obligations of business and the regulator aligned, and to expedite 
complaint resolution, the timelines for business to respond to complaints should also 
apply to the TIO. 
• When the TIO is dealing with a complaint and it refers consumers back to their 
service provider, the TIO should maintain its involvement and follow up with 
consumers to see whether or not they are satisfied with the outcome from the service 
provider so that (i) the TIO is satisfied that the complaint which has been referred to it 
has been resolved and (ii) the burden is not on the consumer to recontact the TIO if 
the referred complaint has not been resolved and (iii) so that data and statistics are 
gathered about the outcomes of the complaints. 
• Consumer groups should have standing to bring complaints before the TIO on behalf 
of aggrieved consumers.  This standing will help resolve collective action problems in 
instances where many people are harmed, but not to the degree that they take action 
independently. 
• The determinations of the TIO should be binding on businesses, but not on the 
consumer.  When a consumer complains to the TIO, the consumer should not be 
precluded from pursing legal action through the courts. 
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6.5 Business-customer relations 
ACMA and business should work together to devise a product lifecycle framework for 
consumer protection. 
• The ACMA should engage with businesses and issue guidance and best practice 
guidelines to help businesses to develop a consumer protection framework that 
covers the lifecycle of their products and services. 
• Customer protection frameworks should include strategies for maintaining fairness 
and achieving the Outcomes in all interactions with customers.  
• To help businesses construct their customer protection frameworks, the ACMA 
should create advisory groups consisting of the various stakeholders and publish 
case studies and statements of good and poor practice to help build an interpretive 
community around the principles-based code. 
• Section 9.4.2 of the current Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code requires 
that consumers be informed by businesses of their options to internally escalate a 
complaint and of their options for external complaint resolution by the TIO.  This 
information is only required to be given if a consumer asks about it or indicates that 
he or she is dissatisfied.  To empower consumers, they should be informed of their 
options to escalate a complaint when first they complain. 
• Businesses should publish information about complaints and complaint management 
annually. 
6.6 Implementation the principles 
• The requirements for complaint handling in Section 9 of the current 
Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code do not go far enough and operate in 
a vacuum.  Companies should adopt a more customer-centred lifecycle approach to 
their products and services.  The ACMA should help companies to do this by 
publishing best-practice guides and issuing guidance on complaint handling and 
customer service throughout the product lifecycle. 
• It is important to note that simply adopting a lifecycle approach in the abstract is not 
enough to ensure focus on consumer protection.  Instead, care must be taken to 
ensure that the approach is focused on consumer benefit and matching consumers’ 
needs and desires to products and services.  To this end, management should be 
more involved in marketing campaigns and advertising, and key performance 
indicators for marketing staff should be tied to whether or not their campaigns 
generate consumer satisfaction or confusion and complaints. 
• To best protect consumers, business should produce ‘key fact’ documents that 
contain essential information that customers should know about a product or service. 
• Complaint data should be used both by businesses and the regulator to gauge how 
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6.7 Options for adopting a principles-based consumer protection scheme 
The need for the regulator to have the power to impose civil penalties based is on the need 
for realistic enforcement options to ensure compliance.  Working through the courts can be 
slow and expensive, and cancelling licenses is a drastic option, particularly when dealing 
with national providers.  The regulator’s power to impose financial sanctions that scale with 
the degree of the harm caused by a breach is an incentive for compliance. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The main strengths of adopting principles-based regulation are that it will (i) help consumers 
by making their welfare, rather than compliance with a set of rules, the focus of regulation (ii) 
allow for more efficient implementation of regulatory obligations by business, (iii) allow 
regulators to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, new developments and loopholes 
and (iv) encourage the regulator to build up a body of regulatory guidance and precedent. 
The main risks are (i) that the regulator may not adequately enforce the principles, as 
happened at the Financial Services Authority in the U.K. and (ii) that the principles are seen 
merely as an aspirational statement.  To prevent this, the regulator, or regulatory division 
charged with enforcing the principles-based code should be mandated solely to protect 
consumers and should be armed with sufficient powers carry out its task. 
Applying the principles will protect consumers and benefit industry. 
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